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Abstract
This paper studies a “market creating” firm (platform) that offers a matching environment
by charging an access fee to a population of high and low type users who wish to form a match.
We focus on an environment where users only observe a signal of their randomly assigned part-
ner’s type and where the informativeness of the signal is controlled by the firm. We study how
both tools, access fee and signal informativeness, can be used to screen particular segments of
the population. We finish by characterizing the set of optimal menus. The paper proposes three
results. We show that information provision has a screening role when network effects are het-
erogeneous because a platform cannot induce every level of participation using only the access
fee. Secondly, any platform will optimally offer a menu such that only high types participate,
or where every user participates. In the former the signal is perfectly informative; in the latter
it is partially informative. Lastly, the profit maximizing firm will over-provide information in
relation to the surplus maximizing firm, and the higher the heterogeneity in the population, the
higher the chance of the optimal menu excluding low type users.
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1 Introduction
Firms that “create markets” to offer them latter to some users are very common. These firms are
also named as platforms. Their financing methods are diverse, and include advertising, merchan-
dizing, requesting donations, and charging subscription fees, among others methods. In this paper,
we are interested in those firms whose subscription fees represent a large fraction of their revenues.
The following one-sided platforms, Linkedin, Dropbox, Phanfare, and Animoto all have in common
a requested subscription fee, and that they provide some of their services free of charge (with the
exception of Phanfare).1 These firms are able to provide some services free of charge due to the fact
that in the last decade their production and distribution costs reduced significantly.2 Two-sided
platform examples are also very common. Consider for example an average dating agency (or em-
ployment agency) available on the World Wide Web. These firms also charge some membership fees
for both men and woman (or workers and firms), and they usually provide some of their services
free of charge.
As expected, while many platforms have been launched providing similar products, only a few of
them are very successful. Without loss of generality, we focus on the one-sided platform. Linkedin
is an example of success. They currently have over 120 million users world-wide. Their revenue for
the second quarter of 2011 is approximately 24 US million dollars, with their market value at over
8 US billion dollars. The cases of Dropbox and Animoto are also interesting. Dropbox has over 25
million users world-wide. Animoto has only 2 million users, however it launched only three years
ago and its conversion rate is around the 10 per cent. Additionally, unsuccessful or small-sized
platforms who compete with those already mentioned, are plentiful.
What are the successful platforms doing right ? We suggest that they were able to add enough
value added to their product that users were happy to pay the membership fee.
Existing analyses of platforms assume that the they own an environment. For example, in an
employment agency workers and employers enter to meet each other and engage in transactions
that otherwise would be more expensive, or that could not be carried out completely. Workers and
employers who wish to use the “new market” must pay a membership fee and/or a per transaction
fee. Research questions in this environment usually focus on the characterization of the equilibrium
outcomes, on the optimal pricing, or on the effect of changes in the market design on the equilibrium
outcomes. All of these questions are valid, but in reality “market creating” firms may simultaneously
use the pricing and market design to affect the equilibrium outcomes, and the available literature
has little to say about this3.
The class of environments we are interested in are the matching environments. We focus
on these environments because they have been extensively studied, because they are empirically
1In fact, Phafare started off by providing some of their services free of charge, but later changed this policy.
2Visit websites such as www.freemium.org for more information.
3See Roth (2002) for an interesting discussion.
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relevant, and because we believe there are strong ties between this literature and the two-sided
market literature that are yet to be studied. Moreover, we wish to exploit the fact that frictions in
these environments are significantly related to the market design and we want to propose a model
where the “market creating” firm decides upon the optimal level of friction between workers and
employers, and that, in general, “users” will have to endure.
In our approach the environment has three main properties. First, participating users cannot
directly observe the characteristics of their randomly assigned partner. In particular they only
observe a noisy signal of their characteristics. The platform selects the informativeness of the
signal. The friction that the “market creating” firm will control is the precision of the information
that users receive on their randomly assigned partner. Second, there are no transfers between users
who form a match. We argue that it is a better approximation than the opposite, where transfers
exist, because usually they are not efficient in dividing the surplus generated by the match among
the matching partners. Finally, signals are affiliated to the objective characteristics, in other words
higher signals are regarded as good news.
The class of “market creating” firms we consider have a strategic advantage over the potential
users, and they are capable of screening any population subgroup if required. Firms from this class
are capable of manipulating users’ willingness to participate in the platform in two ways. In the
extensive margin, and because of the indirect network effects, users’ participation decision depends
on the mass of other users who are also willing to participate. In the two-sided market case this
effect is well understood in the dating agency example. The willingness of men to participate
increases with the participation of women, and vice versa4. In the intensive margin, and because
of the within group network effects, users’ participation decisions are also affected. In the dating
agency example we tend to believe direct network effects are negative because the probability of
any man forming a match is a decreasing function of the mass of men participating. The second
crucial aspect about firms from this class is that they suffer no competition from other platforms.
Our approach analyzes “market creating” firms that satisfy the following characteristics. The
platform will face a population of vertically differentiated users who are divided into two subgroups.
Users’ preferences are quasi-linear. This first characteristic is very natural given that we analyze
matching markets. A second, and more fundamental characteristic is that high type users only
wish to form a match with other high type users, moreover we assume that they dislike forming a
match with low type users. This characteristic is not as strong as it might seem, and is explained
by the fact that our model is static. In a dynamic model we can relax this position to the point
where high type users are willing to form a match with any user, but they prefer doing so with
their peers. Finally, the platform will jointly choose an access fee and the signal’s precision. In
the two-sided platform case the platform can discriminate amongst sides, but not within each side.
Marginal costs are normalized to zero to smooth the analysis.
4This intuition is not robust with heterogeneous network effects since then a man do not care anymore about the
probability of forming a match, but with whom they form a match.
3
We have two main research questions. The first is to understand how a “market creating” firm,
such as those within the class we describe, can use information provision and the access fee to
screen out certain groups of the population. In particular, we wish to identify conditions under
which information provision is required, on top of the access fee, as a screening tool. Alternatively,
we also wish to obtain a characterization of the set of optimal menus of information provision and
access fee. To wit, conditional on the environment characteristics, we will establish the optimal
menu for both the profit maximizing and surplus maximizing platform. As a related issue we will
discuss whether the profit maximizing firm will over or under provide information in relation to
the surplus maximizing platform. We conclude by conducting some comparative statics on the set
of optimal menus.
Our approach is a first step towards the understanding of a decentralized profit maximizing
matching environment. In addition, while addressing the question of “who matches with whom”
this paper does not take as given the market design, but this design is endogenously determined.
Additionally, we address the realistic assumption that the network effects are not homogeneous in
a vertically differentiated world, and we show that the platform is unable to reach all levels of their
demand using only the access fee. In other words, tariffs are no longer insulating as in Weyl (2010).
Market design will not only have the role of increasing users’ willingness to participate, but will
also help the platform to reach all demand levels. Finally, externalities embedded in the class of
environments we propose will allow us to explain the discrepancies between the profit maximizing
and the surplus maximizing platforms.
Our results hinge on one assumption: that while low types are indifferent with whom they match,
the high types dislike matching with low types. We start by showing that there exists a matching
equilibrium in the acceptance stage where the participants use strategies that are increasing in
types. Then we proceed to characterize the set of matching equilibria, and we show that this set
is a complete lattice in which all the equilibria can be ranked according to the economic activity
embedded therein. In the next step we study the participation decisions of high and low type
users, and we discuss the conditions under which the information provision works as a screening
tool. We argue that access fees are not always insulating, as in Weyl (2010)5. Namely, in the case
of heterogeneous network effects the presence of members from a group with a positive measure
will produce a negative externality on other groups of the population, then any platform might
find it optimal to retain a fraction of those users causing the externality, and the access fee will fall
short as a screening tool. We show that to induce participation of a fraction of users from a group
with a positive measure, the platform must use the provision of information as a screening tool.
We study the set of optimal menus, i.e. access fee and information provision, for a “one-sided”
platform, as the main driving forces are easy to explain in this environment and still remain valid for
5Veiga & Weyl (2011) recently studied in general the role of heterogeneous network effect taking as given the
environment. They also show that access fees are not insulating, and that the platform needs to use other non-price
related tools to achieve any level of their demand.
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the analysis of “multi-sided” platforms. Borrowing a terminology from the literature on advertising,
well explained by Johnson & Myatt (2006), any platform can use an Informative Menu either to
retain only one group of the population of users or a Hype Menu where every user is willing to
participate, or a Partial Menu to induce partial participation of one group of the population. We
show that the profit maximizing platform will not use a menu that excludes high type users in the
population, and the set of optimal menus is the Hype Menu and the Informative Menu for high
types. On the other hand, the set of optimal menus for the surplus maximizing platform will also
include a Partial Menu where all high types and a fraction of low types participate.
The profit maximizing platform will over-provide information compared to the surplus maxi-
mizing platform. More precisely, when both platforms offer the Hype Menu we show that indeed
this is the case. To understand the over-provision, it is enough to acknowledge that in the absence
of transfers between users who form a match, the participation of low type users induces a nega-
tive externality on high type users, and consequently the surplus maximizing platform will find it
optimal to provide less information than its profit maximizing counterpart.
The key variable in the comparative statics on the set of optimal menus is the heterogeneity of
users in the population. This variable is captured by the difference between high type and low type
users. A high heterogeneity increases the attractiveness of high types to the platform we analyze.
In particular, we show that the region in the parameter space that supports the Informative Menu
for high types increases with the heterogeneity in the population. The intuition here is reasonably
simple. We show that as high types become more attractive to the platform, it would design the
optimal menu to induce only them to participate.
This paper is from two strands of literature: the two-sided markets literature, and the literature
of matching. The literature on two-sided markets, so far, has focused on building a theory of price
(e.g. Caillaud & Jullien (2001, 2003), Rochet & Tirole (2003, 2006), Armstrong (2006), Weyl
(2010)), or studing aspects of market design (e.g. Hagiu & Jullien (2010a,b), Athey & Ellison
(2008), Damiano & Li (2008)). In our paper the platform can choose both the price and the
signal’s precision (proxy of market design). We can also find papers that give microfoundations for
the user valuations (e.g. Nocke et al. (2007), Hagiu (2009), White (2009)), and others that study
its dynamics (e.g. Hagiu (2006), Sun & Tse (2007), Lee (2010)). In our paper microfoundations
are explained by fundamentals of a matching environment without transfers. While other papers
study within-group discrimination (e.g. Gomes (2009), Dogˇanoglu & Wright (2010)), our paper
only considers between group discrimination. Only recently Veiga & Weyl (2011) studied in general
the topic of heterogeneous network effect. Differences will be made clear in the next paragraph.
The novelty we propose compared to this literature is to understand the platform’s behavior
under the particular environment we describe. One paper that is close to ours is Damiano &
Li (2007). The main difference is that users have imperfect information, and that the platform
can affect both the equilibrium probability of finding a match (intensive margin) and the users’
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willingness to participate (extensive margin). Another paper that is close to ours is Veiga & Weyl
(2011). The main difference of our approach is that we do not take as given the environment but
consider the class of matching environments without transfers between users. Then, by selecting
a particular menu of access fees and information provision, our platform is also determining the
matching equilibrium.
However, our paper is related to the matching literature such as Atakan (2008), Burdett & Coles
(1997), and Chade (2006). There is a significant part of this literature that deals with transferable
utility models, with which we are not related. The novelty we propose here is to understand how
matching equilibrium is affected by the platform’s activities (e.g. optimal pricing and optimal
information provision) given the matching environment we propose. The closest papers to ours are
Eeckhout & Kircher (2008), Poeschel (2008) and Chade (2006) but non of them study the effect of
a profit maximizing platform.
Our model is inspired by Chade’s (2006)6 dynamic matching equilibrium model, and differs
from it in two ways. The first is that we allow users to participate, or not, in the environment the
platform offers. This in itself is an important modification because we are including the direct and
indirect network effects in the analysis. Another feature our model includes is the existence of a
central planner or platform who designs and offers the matching environment for a given access
price. Our central planner affects the environment in two ways: in the extensive margin, given
that he can affect the users’ willingness to participate; and in the intensive margin as the users’
probability of being accepted by their randomly assigned partner depends on the composition of
participating users.
The paper proceeds as follows. Next section, Section two, presents the model and discusses the
solution to the multiplicity of matching equilibria. Section three discusses the participation stage,
and its goal is to show how the information provision can work as a screening device. Section
four discusses the pricing rule and the information provision rule. We also characterize the set of
optimal menus of access fee and provision of information. The next section, Section five, extends
the analysis to a fully two-sided case. Section six concludes.
2 Model
This set-up corresponds to a one-sided market and we will extend the analysis to a two-sided market.
There is a group of users who use the platform to find a match in the population; they can be high
or low. Several important real life examples fit within this framework, in particular a platform
6We acknowledge that there are other papers in the matching literature that analyze the role of signaling, but we
decided to follow Chade’s (2006) approach because we did not want to let participants select their noisy signal and
at the same time allow them to choose to participate. This has a flavor of second degree price discrimination and
our goal is to study only third degree price discrimination. Additionally, we did not want to study directed search,
e.g. sellers moving first in the timing. See the discussion section for more details.
6
that offers an environment where people want to find “friends”, or “peers” or “co-authors”. The
fact that our model does not allow for monetary transfers is not a crucial issue because most real
life environments that include transfers between users do not guarantee them to efficiently divide
the surplus generated by the match, so this model can be regarded as a rough approximation to
(imperfect) transferable utility model environments.
The one-sided, from hereon symmetric, model analyzes one platform that designs and offers an
environment to a population of vertically differentiated users. Inside the environment a user will
randomly meet another user, and can decide to form a match or not. A match is formed only when
both participants accept each other. The platform will obtain revenues from the access fee and will
bear a marginal cost, of both running the platform and providing information, normalized to zero7.
Participants decide to join in if the expected payoff from the match at least covers the access fee.
The platform design is such that participants only observe a noisy signal from their partner, and
side transfers between participants are not allowed.
Time lasts for one period only. The population of potential users, with a mass equal to one
M = 1, can be divided into high types and low types, e.g. a ∈ {a, a}, where a < a, and we
denote Pr{a = a} = λ the fraction of high types in the whole population. A user’s type is private
information. Users only observe a signal from their partner’s type. In particular, a user will observe
a signal α ∈ {α,α}, where α < α, and Pr{α | a} = Pr{α | a} = ρ. Users will not observe their
own signal8.
The good news assumption states that Pr{α | a′} > Pr{α | a} for any a′ > a, which amounts
to:
Assumption 1. ρ > 1/2
Payoff from the matching game. The matching payoff is assumed to be the minimum of the
types involved in the match. This implies that hight type agents will only obtain a payoff equal
to a when they form a match with another high type agent. In any other situation, e.g. when a
high type forms a match with a low type, or when two low type agents form a match, the payoff
of each agent will be a. Moreover, when agents form a match they must pay an opportunity cost
(c > 0) that is type dependent. This last feature captures the intuition that foregone opportunities
for high type agents are higher than for low type agents.
Assumption 2. When agents a, a′ ∈ {a, a} form a match, the payoff for agent a is min{a, a′}−ac.
Moreover, the environment offered by the platform is such that low type users never perceive a
7We have carried out the calculations with both costs and results do not qualitatively change, instead formulas
become more intrincated. The presence of fixed and sunk costs is non-problematic in our setup because we analyze
a platform in isolation, where they will gain greater importance in the analysis of several competing platforms.
8We do not argue that in reality users cannot observe the signal they have attached, or that it is not important.
Allowing users to observe it will unnecessarily complicate the analysis of any platform because all we need is that
users’ strategies on the matching game are directly affected by the platform.
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negative payoff, even when they form a match with low type partners. The situation for high types
is different, in particular, the net payoff of forming a match with a low type partner will yield a
negative payoff.
Assumption 3. a(1− c) > 0 > a− ac
A simplification is that low type agents care only about finding a match, while high type
agents care about finding a good match. Assumption (3) guarantees that the payoff function is
logsupermodular9. In the appendix we discuss how the paper’s main results still hold for this
general class of functions.
The platform charges a linear price to all potential users (P ), and chooses the precision of the
signal ρ. Users will participate if their expected match surplus outweighs the access fee.
The strategy of a user will consist, on the one hand, of an acceptance rule conditional on his type
and his information of his partner, i.e. σaα : {a, a}×{α,α} → [0, 1] where 0 is reject. On the other
hand, it will consist of a participation rule conditional only on his type, i.e. γa : {a, a} → {0, 1}
where 1 stands for enter. Notice that in the participation decision we do not consider mixed
strategies.
The timing is as follows. At the beginning, (i) A user privately learn his type, e.g. a ∈ {a, a}.
Then, (ii) the platform determines access fee and information provision, e.g. P and ρ. At the
next step, (iii) users decide to enter or stay out. Among those who participate, (iv) users meet
randomly, and they privately learn the signal from their partner α. Within each pair, (v) users
accept or reject their partner. Finally, (vi) if both users accept they form a match and receive the
corresponding payoff, otherwise they stay single and receive zero payoff.
2.1 Matching Equilibrium
We want to find the conditions for a participation/matching equilibrium to exist. Such equilibrium
is described by (ρa, σaα, σaα) for a ∈ {a, a}, such that users decisions form a Nash equilibrium.
We are imposing some structure over users’ behavior inside the environment. We will study the
situation where high type users prefer to match with high types, rather than with low types.
One additional piece of notation is necessary. The expected payoff of accepting signal α after
9A function f(x, y) is logsupermodular if it satisfies f(x2, y2)/f(x2, y1) > f(x1, y2)/f(x1, y1) for x2 > x1 and
y2, y1. See Topkins (1998) and Smith (2006) for further technical details and for its implications on the matching
literature.
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participating and given all available information10, is
v(α, a) = Pr{α | a}
[
(a− ac)σaαPr{a | α} + (a− ac)σaαPr{a | α}
]
+ Pr{α | a}
[
(a− ac)σaαPr{a | α} + (a− ac)σaαPr{a | α}
]
v(α, a) = (a− ac)
[
Pr{a | α}(Pr{α | a}σaα + Pr{α | a}σaα) + Pr{a | α}(Pr{α | a}σaα + Pr{α | a}σaα)
]
The environment is rather simple because from assumptions (2) and (3) all low type users will
accept their partner, e.g. σaα = σaα = 1, and we have
v(α, a) = a(1− c)Pr{Accepted, a | α}+ (a− ac)Pr{a | α} (1)
v(α, a) = a(1− c)[Pr{a | α}+ Pr{Accepted, a | α}] (2)
where the probability a high type is accepted by another high type user is Pr{Accepted, a | α} =
Pr{a | α}(Pr{α | a}σaα + Pr{α | a}σaα).
We need to make two important distinctions. Define λ as the proportion of high types on the
platform, which we distinguish from the proportion of high types in the population λ. Similarly, we
should distinguish the mass of users participating M from the total mass of users in the population
M .
Under this simple model we can explicitly describe the joint distribution of types and signal, in
particular Pr{a, α} = ρλ, Pr{a, α} = (1−ρ)λ, Pr{a, α} = (1−ρ)(1−λ), and Pr{a, α} = ρ(1−λ).
Using this joint distribution we will parametrize equations (1) and (2).
Before continuing further, it is important to emphasize an obvious but significant implication of
the model. Assumptions (1) - (3) guarantee that high type users experience a higher than expected
payoff when they accept a high signal partner than when they accept a low signal partner. The
opposite will hold for low type users, that is, their expected payoff of accepting a low signal partner
is higher than with the high signal partner.
Lemma 1. v(α, a) > v(α, a) and v(α, a) < v(α, a).
Proof. See appendix.
The previous lemma is crucial to anticipate the role of the provision of information, and in
general of the market design. Platforms will select the optimal menu of access fee and information
provision with the objective of attracting a particular segment of the population. For example, if it
believes that the low types are the most attractive group the optimal menu will increase the value
added of the environment to these users, and will decrease the value added to the high type users.
The access fee will extract all low type users’ trade surplus. The provision of information, and in
general the market design, is a tool for the platforms to provide value added. In our set-up the
value added for high (low) type users increases (decreases) with the signal’s precision.
10At the matching game users know their type, the signal of their partner, and the fraction of high type users in
the environment. We acknowledge the analysis differs if they did not know λ.
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Figure 1: Case (i), c > 0
2.1.1 Pure Strategies
The analysis of the matching game reduces to the understanding of high type users strategies. We
will start by considering the cases where these users accept or reject a randomly assigned partner
with a probability equal to one. In the first case, which we call Case (i), they will only accept
high signal partners (σaα, σaα) = (1, 0). In a second case, called from hereon Case (ii), the high
type users will accept every partner they encounter. Lastly, called from hereon Case (iii), they will
reject any partner. We will say a few words about the region, in the space (ρ, λ), where each of
these cases can be sustained.
Case (i): (σaα, σaα) = (1, 0) .
The expected payoff of accepting a randomly assigned partner, given all available information,
for a high type user can be positive or negative. Recall the participation of low type users produces
a negative externality on the high users. The expected payoff of accepting a will be,
v(α, a) = a(1− c)Pr{a | α}ρ+ (a− ac)Pr{a | α} ≶ 0
High type users’ strategies in the matching game are characterized by a threshold condition,
this condition is guaranteed by lemma (1). If v(α, a) > 0 > v(α, a) the high type will accept only
high signal partners. Figure (1) shows the pairs (λ, ρ) such that the high type user’s behavior
satisfies this condition. Inside the shaded region, high type users are more selective than low type
users when deciding who to accept; namely there is an equilibrium of the matching game where
high types accept only high signal partners.
We can understand the high type’s decision by focusing on the ratio Pr{a|α}
Pr{a|α} , for a ∈ {a, a}.
This object represents the ratio of the mass of high type users versus the mass of low type users
that decided to participate in the platform conditional on the observed signal. If the high type
user observes a high signal the ratio becomes ρλ(1−ρ)(1−λ) , and this function is increasing in ρ and λ.
10
Then, for this situation, high type users benefit from high levels of participation from other high
type users, and also from high levels information. On the other hand, if a low signal is observed
the ratio is now (1−ρ)λ
ρ(1−λ) and while still it is increasing in λ, it is decreasing in ρ. Hence high quality
of the signal make this “selective” equilibrium easier to support for any λ.
Case (ii): (σaα, σaα) = (1, 1) .
The expected payoff of accepting, given all available information, will now be,
v(α, a) = aPr{a | α} + aPr{a | α} − ac ≷ 0
As for Case (i) we know that lemma (1) guarantees that the high type’s accept/reject decision
is completely characterized by a threshold. The equilibrium condition here is that “every other”
high type user that participates accepts any partner he encounters, e.g. v(α, a) > 0. This condition
in fact determines the best reply for the high type user we analyze.
Figures (2) provides further intuition. In this figure the opportunity cost is above the minimum
level11. We observe that this matching equilibrium can be sustained for high enough levels of
proportion of high types λ. This fact also is robust to any level of user heterogeneity. Finally,
notice that if only high type users decide to participate (λ = 1) any level of information provision
is compatible with this matching equilibrium.
Figure 2: Case (ii), c = 0.5
Case (iii). The expected payoff of accepting, given all available information, will be negative
because only low type users will accept any partner
v(α, a) = (a− ac)Pr{a | α} < 0
11If the opportunity cost is very close to the minimum level cmin we can show that any point in the parameter
space (ρ, λ) supports this matching equilibrium.
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The optimal decision in this case is quite trivial. High type users will reject any partner and low
type users will accept any partner. Additionally, this matching case will prevail if the proportion
of high type users λ is very small.
Remark 1. Restrict the attention to Case (i) - Case (iii) when both type of users participate. In
this situation the proportion of high type users is equal to λ and the mass of users is equal to one,
M = 1. When λ is different from zero or one we obtain the following insights. If λ is very low
the optimal reaction will be to reject any partner as long as the precision of the signal is not high
enough because the high types will only accept high signal partners. On the other hand, if λ is not
very low the optimal reaction will be to either accept everyone or to only accept high signal partners.
2.1.2 Mixed Strategies.
Two additional matching equilibria in mixed strategies should be analyzed. In the first one, which
we call Case (i) Mixed, high type users will reject low signal partners and will mix with high signal
partners. The other case, which we call Case (ii) Mixed, high type users will accept high signal
partners and will mix with low signal partners12.
Case (ii) Mixed: (σaα, σaα) = (1, σ
∗
aα) .
The expected payoff of accepting a randomly assigned partner, given all available information,
is still negative. That is,
v(α, a) = a(1− c)Pr{a | α}[ρ+ (1− ρ)σaα] + (a− ac)Pr{a | α} ≷ 0
The mixing condition for the high type users is v(α, a) = 0 which yields an equilibrium proba-
bility of accepting high signal partners equal to
σ∗aα =
(
ac− a
a− ac
)
1
1− ρ
Pr{a | α}
Pr{a | α}
−
ρ
1− ρ
Equilibrium conditions will be that σaα ∈ [0, 1]. The following figure shows the region in the
parameter space (ρ, λ) that sustains this matching equilibrium. The most striking feature is that
this region does not include the situation where only high type users choose to participate (λ = 1),
and the intuitive reason is that it makes no sense to reject a low signal partner with a positive
probability if we already know only high type users are participating.
To better understand the decision of high type users notice that the expected payoff of accepting
a partner with a low signal, e.g. v(α, a), is determined by the ratio between the mass of high type
users that participate and the mass of low type users that participate conditional on observing an
12We do not consider the situation where high types mix with high signal partners and accept low signal partners
because by construction the expected payoff of accepting is higher with high signals than with low signals.
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Figure 3: Case (ii) Mixed, c > 0
low signal, e.g. Pr{a|α}
Pr{a|a} . As we discussed in Case (i), this ratio is always an increasing function on
the mass of high types that participate λ, and is increasing in ρ when the high type user observes
a high of signal, and decreasing when he observes a low signal.
Case (i) Mixed: (σaα, σaα) = (σ
∗
aα, 0) .
The expected payoff of accepting, given all available information, now will be,
v(α, a) = a(1− c)Pr{a | α}ρσaα + (a− ac)Pr{a | α} ≷ 0
The mixing condition for the high type users is v(α, a) = 0 which yields an equilibrium proba-
bility of accepting high signal partners,
σ∗aα =
(
ac− a
a− ac
)
Pr{a | α}
ρPr{a | α}
Finally we place one bound that guarantee σaα ∈ (0, 1). The upper bound condition such that
the mixing probability is less than one is 0 < a(1− c)ρ2λ+(a−ac)(1− ρ)(1−λ). Figure (4) shows
that there is an important region from the parameter space where matching equilibrium can be
sustained.
2.1.3 Characterization
Two questions should be addressed, (1) the existence of a matching equilibrium13, and (2) how to
deal with the multiplicity of equilibria.
Both questions are closely related and will be jointly tackled. Using the previous section we
can construct the best reply correspondence, denoted as Ωa(σ;λ, ρ) where σ = (σaα, σaα) and
a ∈ {a, a}, using figures (5) and (6). We observe that if costs are very low, e.g. c = cmin, only two
13We focus on the Nash equilibrium of the matching game between high and low type users that participate.
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Figure 4: Case (i) Mixed, c = 0.6
matching equilibria can be supported. In particular, either high type users accept every partner
they encounter, e.g. Case (ii), or they reject low signal partners and mix with high signal partners,
e.g. Case (i) Mixed. Figure (5) shows this situation.
On the other hand, if the opportunity cost is above the minimum level all matching equilibrium
may be supported. Using Figure (6), the highest ranked matching equilibrium is represented by
the union of regions A, B and C; for the second highest ranked matching equilibrium the regions
will be B and C; for the third in the ranking, the regions will be B, C and D; and for the last
matching equilibrium the regions will be A, C and D. Finally, in region E the high type users will
reject everyone.
Figure 5: All Cases, c ≈ cmin, ∆a
medium
Figure 6: All Cases, c > cmin, ∆a
medium
The best reply correspondence for low type users is trivial because by construction they will
accept any partner, Ωa(σ; ρ, λ) = {(1, 1)}. High type users’ case is different and depends on which
region of the parameter space (ρ, λ) we are looking at. Without loss of generality consider Figure
(6) where costs are above the minimum level. Denoting as (ρJ , λJ) all the pairs of ρ and λ that
belong to region J ∈ {A,B,C,D,E}, we can label the best reply correspondences accordingly
Ωa(σ; ρ
J , λJ).
In region A of Figure (6) only two matching equilibrium can be supported, one where every
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partner is accepted (Case (ii)) and other where every partner is rejected (Case(iii)). The best reply
correspondence Ωa(σ; ρ
A, λA) will be {(1, 1)} for the first equilibrium and {(0, 0)} for the other
equilibrium. A similar argument holds for region D of Figure (6). There either the high type user
only accept high signal users (Case (i)) or they do not accept any randomly assigned partner (Case
(iii)). The best response correspondence Ωa(σ; ρ
D, λD) will be {(1, 0)} for the first equilibrium and
{(0, 0)} for the other equilibrium. The last region whose best reply correspondence is very simple
is region E, there only matching equilibrium Case (iii) can be supported.
Regions B and C of Figure (6) have richer best reply correspondences. In the first region three
matching equilibrium can be sustained, high type users may accept any partner (Case (ii)), or they
can accept high signal partners and mix with low signal partners (Case (ii) Mixed), or they can
reject any partner (Case (iii)). The best reply correspondence Ωa(σ; ρ
B , λB) will be {(1, 1)} for the
first equilibrium, {(1, σ∗aα)} for the second equilibrium, and will be {(0, 0)} for the last equilibrium.
Finally, in region C of Figure (6) all the matching equilibria can be supported. The best reply
correspondence will be
Ωa(σ; ρ
C , λC) =


{(0, 0)} if σ = (0, 0)
{(σ∗aα, 0)} if σ = (σ
∗
aα, 0)
{(1, 0)} if σ = (1, 0)
{(1, σ∗aα)} if σ = (1, σ
∗
aα)
{(1, 1)} if σ = (1, 1)
High type’s best response correspondence is increasing at each region of Figure (6). Indeed, for
any σ′, σ′′ ∈ [0, 1]2, such that σ′ ≤ σ′′, we can verify that for every element from the best response
given σ′, e.g. b ∈ Ωa(σ
′), we can find an element from the best response given σ′′, e.g. c ∈ Ωa(σ
′′),
such that b ≤ c. For example in region C, taking σ′ = (1, 0) and σ′′ = (1, σaα), for (1, 0) ∈ Ωa(1, 0)
we know that (1, σaα) ∈ Ωa(1, σaα) and on top (1, 0) ≤ (1, σaα). We conclude that high type’s best
response correspondence is upper and lower increasing14.
Proposition 1. (i) The set of matching equilibria is nonempty, and we can determine “the greatest
and the least” matching equilibria. (ii) The set of matching equilibria is a nonempty complete lattice.
The previous result is useful at least in two ways. Though multiplicity of equilibria in this
environment is unavoidable, we know enough from the structure of the set of matching equilibria
to rank them according to the “economic activity”. In other words, “economic activity” from the
matching equilibrium where high type users accept any partner, e.g. (σaα, σaα) = (1, 1), is strictly
higher than the one coming from the matching equilibrium where high type users accept high signal
partners and mix with low signal partners15, e.g. (σaα, σaα) = (1, σ
∗
aα). Using this line of reasoning
14We acknowledge there are different definitions of increasing correspondences, in particular in the literature is
common to use Veinott’s definition. We do not use this definition in Proposition (1). Our definition of “increasing
correspondences” is explained in detail by Calciano (2009).
15Intuitively this fact comes from the linearity of v(α, a) on σaα and σaα.
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the ranking of equilibria is the following: (0, 0)  (σaα, 0)  (1, 0)  (1, σaα)  (1, 1).
Using proposition (1) we posit that agents will coordinate on the “greatest” matching equilib-
rium. Multiplicity of equilibria calls for an indifference breaking rule, and we propose one such that
(high and low) users who participate will coordinate on the “greatest” matching equilibrium. We
argue that this assumption is not restrictive because the expected payoff of accepting a partner,
e.g. v(α, a), is an increasing function of σaα and σaα. While users agree on using this matching
equilibrium because their expected payoff is higher, the platform will also prefer it because the
greater “economic activity” is, the greater rent he can extract using participation fee (P).
3 Participation
The objective of this section is to analyze how any platform can use both tools to induce any level
of participation from high type and low type users. We will begin by showing there is a non-
monotonic relationship between the mass of users participating (M) and the fraction of high type
users participating (λ). We will then show that the access fee is not enough to reach every level
of λ. Finally, we will comment on which matching equilibria place restrictions on the relationship
between both tools.
To proceed with the analysis define two additional pieces of notation. First, let U(a, λ, ρ),
where a ∈ {a, a}, be user’s expected participation payoff gross of the participation fee. We will also
have four expected participation payoffs: U i(a, λ, ρ), U ii(a, λ, ρ), U im(a, λ, ρ), U
ii
m(a, λ, ρ). Second,
let A ≤ λ be the mass of high type users willing to participate, and A ≤ 1− λ be the mass of low
type users willing to participate. Notice the fraction of high type users inside the environment is
λ = A
A+A
.
Figure (7) shows the mass of participants (M) is a non-monotonic function of λ. There we plot
at the abscissa the proportion of high type users that choose to participate, e.g. λ = A
A+A
, and the
mass of participating users on the y-axis, e.g. M = A + A. Notice that in point X we find only
low type users because λ = 0 and the mass of users is equal to 1 − λ, and on the other extreme,
point Z, there are only high types participating because λ = 1 and the mass of users is equal to λ.
Moreover, the situation with the highest participation (M = 1) is at point Y, there the proportion
of high type users that participate is exactly λ. Finally, points over the segment XY represent a
situation where all low type users, and a fraction of high type users, choose to participate; similarly,
points over the segment Y Z represent a situation where a fraction of low type users, and all high
users, choose to participate.
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Figure 7: Non-Monotonicity Between λ and M
3.1 Example
We will narrow the analysis to the matching equilibrium where high users accept any high signal
partners and reject low signal partners, Case (i). According to Proposition (1) this matching
equilibrium is the third highest ranked, but we decided to use it because the explanation is easier16.
The gross expected participation payoff for this matching equilibrium will be
U i(a, λ, ρ) = Pr{α}v(α, a)
= a(1− c)ρ2λ+ (a− ac)(1 − ρ)(1− λ)
U i(a, λ, ρ) = Pr{α}v(α, a) + Pr{α}v(α, a)
= a(1− c)[(1 − ρ)λ+ (1− λ)]
Begin considering a situation where the platform find optimal to only host low type users17,
(λ,M) = (0, 1 − λ), point X. Here the gross expected participation payoff for the high type user
should be negative, U i(a, 0, ρ) = (a− ac)(1 − ρ) < 0, but should be positive for the low type user,
U i(a, 0, ρ) = a(1−c) > 0. The platform just need to fix the access fee equal to a(1−c), the provision
of information plays no particular role and its optimal level need only to satisfy the equilibrium
conditions coming from Accept/Reject stage18 and from Assumption (1).
Before continuing its important to make a remarks about the role of ρ. The information
provision has a subtle screening role. The platform uses the access fee to extract all the expected
16If high type users play the matching equilibrium Case (ii) the platform will find useless information provision
because, no matter its level, these users will accept any partner they meet. Additionally, if we assume high type
users play the matching equilibrium Case (ii) Mixed, then we cannot study the situation where only high type users
participate because makes no sense to mix if only high users participate.
17As will be shown latter, this situation may arise if the heterogeneity in the population of users is low enough.
18We need also to include restriction from the Participation stage but here they are trivially satisfied.
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participation payoff from the low type users. But still we face the risk that some high type users
find appealing to participate because they believe other high type users are willing to do it. The
platform solves this caveat by providing a level of information where high types believe no other
high type user is willing to participate. For this case this require providing a noisy signal.
Now imagine conditions related to ∆a, λ, and c change and the platform wishes to inducesome
high type users to participate. This situation is equivalent to place ourself on the segment XY ,
the proportion of high types participating will be λ = A
A+(1−λ)
, and the mass of users will be
M = A + (1 − λ). In this case the gross expected participation payoff of high type and low type
users will be respectively U i(a, λ, ρ) and U i(a, λ, ρ). To induce this level of participation a platform
needs to guarantee the net expected participation payoff is always zero for high type users and
positive for low type users. The way to achieve this is by fixing the information provision at a level
such that high type user perceive no net expected participation payoff; define as ρ = ρ(A,P ) the
provision level guaranteeing U i(a, λ, ρ) = P 19.
The provision of information has a strong role in the screening. The platform must use the
provision of information not to increase the users’ willingness to participate, but to guarantee high
type users attain a certain level of gross expected participation payoff.
Lets move on and assume the platform wishes to get on board all users, point Y. In this situation
the mass of users will be equal to one, M = 1, the proportion of high types will equal to λ, and the
gross expected participation payoff for high type users and low type users will be U (i)(a, λ, ρ) and
U (i)(a, λ, ρ) respectively. As with point X, the access fee will be the only screening device and will
be pinned down by min{U (i)(a, λ, ρ), U (i)(a, λ, ρ)}. Finally, the optimal provision of information
for the profit maximizing platform will differ in relation to the decision of the profit maximizing
platform.
Moving on with the story, assume that conditions over ∆a, λ and c changed again and the
platform wishes to keep all high type users, but only want to hold a fraction of low type users.
This case is represented by any of the points on the segment Y Z, there the fraction of high type
users will be λ = λ
λ+A
, and the mass of users will be M = λ + A. By analogy to every point in
segment XY , the platform must fix the provision of information to a level, say ρ = ρ(A,P ), that
guarantees low types’ net expected participation payoff is equal to zero, U i(a, λ, ρ) = P , and high
types perceive a positive payoff, U i(a, λ, ρ) > 0 20.
The last case, which is the opposition to point X, is when the platform is only interested in
high type users, point Z. In this case the proportion of high type users (λ) is equal to one, the
mass of users will be equal to λ, and the gross expected participation payoff for high and low type
19These conditions require finding the right level of provision ρ that solves a(1−c)λ
(a−ac)(1−λ)
ρ2− ρ+1 = P , and guaran-
teeing low types’ net expected participation payoff is positive, U i(a, λ, ρ) = a(1− c)(λ(1− ρ) + (1− λ)) ≥ P .
20These conditions require fixing the provision level ρ at λ+A
λ
, and guaranteeing high type users’ gross expected
participation payoff if positive U i(a, λ, ρ) = a(1− c)ρ+ (a− ac)(1− ρ)
(
A
λ+A
)
≥ 0.
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users will be U i(a, 1, ρ) = a(1− c)ρ2 and U i(a, 1, ρ) = a(1− c)(1 − ρ), respectively. By analogy to
point X, the platform will pindown the access fee with U i(a, 1, ρ) and must pick the right level of
provision.
The information provision has no role in screening. By picking an access fee that extracts
all high users’ expected participation payoff no low type user is willing to participate. Then, the
platform do not need to use the information provision as in point X.
Remark 2. The provision of information works as a screening device whenever the platform wishes
to put on board a fraction of the users of one particular type, e.g. either points on the segment XY
or on the segment Y Z.
3.2 Screening & Matching Equilibria
This section discusses some restrictions different matching equilibria imposes on the screening power
of the access fee and information provision. We will emphasize on one point, that the provision of
information has a screening role whenever high type users accept low signal partners with a positive
probability.
Within each matching equilibrium we will start explaining the three full participation cases:
where only high type users participate (λ = 1), where every user participate (λ = λ), and where
only low type users participate (λ = 0). Lastly, we will proceed with the two partial participation
cases: where all low types participate and a fraction of high types participate ( λ
λ+A
), and vice versa
( A
A+(1−λ)
).
Case (ii). This is the easiest case to analyze because both high and low type users are willing
to accept any partner they encounter. The direct implication we wish to stress is that the gross
expected participation payoffs will not depend on the provision of information, and thus this tool
will have no strategic use. The gross expected participation payoff will be,
U ii(a, λ, ρ) = aλ+ a(1− λ)− ac
U ii(a, λ, ρ) = a(1− c)
Using Figure (7) we will go through the conditions to be met for achieving every level of
participation. If the platform wishes to put retain only high type users, point Z where (λ,M) =
(1, λ), provides a gross expected participation payoff for high types of U ii(a, 1) = a(1 − c) and
for low types of U ii(a, 1) = a(1 − c). The only restriction which has to hold is that the entry fee
outweighs gross expected participation payoff of low type users, e.g. a(1 − c) ≥ P > a(1 − c). At
the point X, where (λ,M) = (0, 1 − λ), the gross expected participation payoff for low types is
U ii(a, 0) = a(1−c) and for the high types is U ii(a, 0) = a−ac, with the usual restriction. Finally, if
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the platform wishes to support full participation, point Y where (λ,M) = (λ, 1), the gross expected
participation payoff will be equal to U ii(a, λ) and U ii(a, λ), and the condition for participation is
that Min{U ii(a, λ), U ii(a, λ)} ≥ P .
This matching equilibrium does not support any partial participation, e.g. points on segments
XY and Y Z. Indeed, as the gross expected participation payoffs for both type of users are not
affected by the provision of information its impossible to find a level of provision such that the net
participation payoff, of high or low type users, is exactly equal to zero. To be precise, it does not
exist a provision level ρ and ρ such that respectively U ii(a, λ, ρ) = P and U ii(a, λ, ρ) = P .
Lets finish stressing that the provision of information do not work as a screening tool for this
case. The story will be very different if the platform can affect the probability any user to be
accepted, just like in the following matching equilibrium we discuss bellow.
Case (ii) Mixed. This matching equilibria is very important because the platform can influence
the probability of a user to be accepted inside the environment. Indeed, here high type users will
accept low signal partners with a probability less or equal to one, e.g. σaα = σaα(ρ), then any
platform can affect the probability of forming a match by manipulating ρ. The expected payoff of
participation will be,
U iim(a, λ, ρ) = (2ρ− 1)(ac− a)
(
1− λ
1− ρ
)
U iim(a, λ, ρ) =
a
a
1
(1− ρ)2
[
a(1− c)(1 − ρ)(1 − ρ− λρ) + (ac− a)ρ2(1− λ)
]
Now discuss the conditions associated to each participation level. The platform will not retain
only high type users, e.g. point Z where (λ,M) = (1, λ), for this matching equilibrium because the
gross expected participation payoff for high types is equal to zero. Intuitively, high type users will
not follow this matching equilibrium because makes no sense rejecting a low signal partner if they
know only high types are participating. Formally, if λ = 1 be obtain that σaα = −ρ/(1 − ρ) and
its clearly impossible to have this probability equal to zero because by assumption (1) we can only
deal with ρ > 1/2.
For the other extreme case, e.g. point X where (λ,M) = (0, 1 − λ), the gross expected par-
ticipation payoff for low types is U iim(a, 0, ρ) =
a
a
1
(1−ρ)2
[a(1 − c)(1 − ρ)2 + (ac − a)ρ2] and for the
high types is U iim(a, 0, ρ) = (ac − a)
2ρ−1
1−ρ . Additionally we should impose the condition that the
access fee outweighs the gross expected participation payoff from high types, but not the one from
low types. Finally, when the platform wishes to put on board every users, e.g. point Y where
(λ,M) = (λ, 1), the gross expected participation payoff for the high and low type users will be,
respectively, U iim(a, λ, ρ) and U
ii
m(a, λ, ρ). The only condition to be met is that the access fee must
be equal to the minimum of these two gross expected participation payoffs.
Until now the provision of information does not work as a screening device. As shown at the
beginning of this section, if the platform wishes to induce a partial participation from either the
20
high or low type of users, he must use the provision of information as a screening device. Starting
with the situation when he wishes to keep all the high types and only a fraction of the low types,
e.g. points on the segment Y Z where λ = λ
λ+A
and M = λ + A, the platform should fix the
provision at a level ρ such that U iim(a, λ, ρ) = P , and at the same time guarantee U
ii
m(a, λ, ρ) > P
21.
The other partial participation case, e.g. points on segment XY where λ = A
A+(1−λ)
and
M = A+ (1− λ), is when the platform wishes to keep all low types and only fraction of high type
users. By analogy, the platform should fix the provision ρ at a level such that high types obtain
zero net payoff from participation. Additionally, low type users’ net payoff for participating should
be greater or equal to zero, U iim(a, λ, ρ) > P
22.
Case (i). This case was already introduced at the beginning of this section. Let us remind that
within this matching equilibrium the provision of information does serves as a screening device
whenever the platform wishes to attain a participation level different from λ ∈ {1, 0, λ}.
Remark 3. Case (i) Mixed will not be used in a “one-sided” platform such as this we present.
By construction we know the gross expected participation payoff for high type users will be equal to
zero, then the only reason these users will consider targeting this matching equilibrium is because
the access fee is non-positive. This situation is very unlikely and the results we achieve are not
affected if we drop out this matching equilibrium. In the appendix we present all analytical results
corresponding to this case.
4 Pricing and Information Provision
The objective of this section is to uncover the optimal pair of access fee and information provision
for all the parameter space. We will start discussing the optimal menu given different participation
levels, special attention is devoted to the information provision rule and the pricing rule. We finish
discussing which participation level is optimal given different combinations of ∆a, λ and c.
A platform at this point observes the environment’s characteristics and decides the access
fee (P) and the signal (ρ). Environments’ characteristics are determined by users’ heterogeneity
(∆a ≡ a−a), by the proportion of high types (λ) in the population, and by the opportunity cost (c).
Among these the most relevant of them, at least for our main results, is user’s heterogeneity. This
parameter provide’s valuable information for the optimal design of the environment, for example,
if the difference is significantly high a profit maximizing platform will have strong incentives to
21These conditions require finding the ρ that solves a(1 − c)(1 − ρ)(1 − ρ − ρλ) + (ac − a)ρ2(1 − λ) = P , and
guaranteeing U iim(a, λ, ρ) = (ac− a)
(
A
λ+A
)(
2ρ−1
1−ρ
)
> P , which is satisfied by construction.
22This condition is indeed satisfied. After making all the necessary replacements we obtain that U iim(a, λ, ρ) =
a
a
(
1−λ
A+(1−λ)
)
(a− a) > P .
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construct a very attractive environment to high type users23.
At this stage we need to consider additional constraints that characterize high type users. We
wish that the high type users are more selective than low type users. This behavior is guaranteed
as long as the difference between accepting only high signal partners (e.g. Pr{α}v(α, a)) and
accepting any partner (e.g. Pr{α}v(α, a)+Pr{α}v(α, a)) is an increasing function of the type, e.g.
v(α, a)− v(α, a) < 0. Finally we need to guarantee the high types are willing to participate, this is
equivalent as saying the payoff of accepting any partner is an increasing function of the type, e.g.
Pr{α}[v(α, a)− v(α, a)] + Pr{α}[v(α, a)− v(α, a)] > 0.
Remark 4. In the characterization of the matching equilibrium we learned that if costs are very low,
e.g. c ≈ cmin, only two matching equilibria can be supported. Also we learned that if opportunity
costs rises every marching equilibrium can be supported.
In addition we observe that, given an opportunity cost above cmin, when heterogeneity is very
high the matching equilibrium where high type users accept any partner cannot be supported. But
as long as heterogeneity reduces, its possible to support more and more this matching equilibrium,
and at the same time the regions for matching equilibrium Case (i) and Case (ii) Mixed will be
reduced. At the extreme situation, where heterogeneity is the minimum, the matching equilibrium
where high type users accept high signal partner and mix with low signal partner, e.g. Case (ii)
Mixed, cannot be supported.
See appendix for detailed analysis.
The maximization program is constrained for each level of participation. Besides the natural
constraint coming from Assumption (1), e.g. ρ ∈ (0.5, 1], we must include the restrictions coming
from the participation stage, and the accept/reject stage. Given λ ∈ {1, 0, λ, A
A+(1−λ)
, λ
λ+A
}, define
the set
Φλ = {ρ×A×A ∈ (0.5, 1] × [0, λ]× [0, 1 − λ] : v(α, a)− v(α, a) ≤ 0,
P r{α}[v(α, a)− v(α, a)] + Pr{α}[v(α, a)− v(α, a)] ≥ 0,
EquilibriumConditions}
where the “Equilibrium Conditions” restrictions depend on which matching equilibrium we are
analyzing. For example, in the case of high type users accepting high signal partners, e.g. Case (i),
the equilibrium conditions require the expected payoff for a high type user of accepting a partner
with a low signal to be negative, e.g. v(α, a) < 0, and also require the expected payoff of accepting
a high signal partner to be positive, e.g. v(α, a) > 0. Similarly, for Case (ii) we require that
v(α, a) > 0, for Case (i) Mixed that v(α, a) = 0, and for Case (ii) Mixed that v(α, a) = 0.
23This intuition does not necessarily apply for a surplus maximizing platform because we already know they care
not for the marginal users, but for the inframarginal ones. Latter in the paper we will go into these issues in greater
detail.
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The second set of restrictions comes from the participation stage and will depend on which
types are willing to participate,
ΨM = {ρ×A×A ∈ (0.5, 1] × [0, λ]× [0, 1− λ] : ParticipationConditions}
where the mass of participating users (M) includes the cases of full group participation (λ ∈
{0, λ, 1}) and the cases of partial group participation (λ ∈ {A+ (1− λ), λ+ A}). For example, in
Case (i) the participation constraint will be that the gross expected participation payoff of high
type users must be strictly higher than the one corresponding to low type users, e.g. aρ2 > a(1−ρ).
Definition 1. Conditional on the matching equilibrium and on having full group participation
(partial group participation), a information provision level (participation level) is feasible if it
belongs to Φλ ∩ΨM .
Until now we have no restriction on the objective function. If the platform wishes to maximize
its profits, the objective function is defined by revenues coming from the access fees24. On the
other hand, if the platform cares about the social surplus, the objective function will be the sum
of the gross expected participation payoffs from those willing to pay the access fee. Denoting as
F (·) a generic function whose only argument could be either ρ, A or A, the optimization program
for each matching equilibrium will be maxF (·) such that the argument lies within Φλ ∩ΨM .
4.1 Pricing and Information Provision Given Participation
For the remaining of the section we will begin obtaining the optimal information provision rule in
the cases of Full Group Participation, both for profit maximizing and surplus maximizing platform.
Then, we will present the optimal pricing rule for the case of Partial Group Participation, both for
profit maximizing and surplus maximizing platform. We will conclude obtaining the optimal pair
of access fee and information provision levels for every point of the parameter space.
4.1.1 Full Group Participation
Private Optimal Signal. The question we ask ourselves here is what is the optimal signal a
profit maximizing platform will establish given a fixed participation level. The impact of higher
levels of information we saw is positive for high type users, but its detrimental to low type users.
Then we posit a profit maximizing platform will provide high levels of information the higher the
proportion of high type users participating.
Begin analyzing the extreme participation cases. If only high type users participate the profit
maximizing platform must guarantee these users face the right levels of access fee and information
such that no low type user is willing to participate. As the gross expected participation payoff for
24Recall that we normalize all marginal costs to zero
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these users is increasing in ρ the platform will have strong incentives to provide as much information
as possible because this guarantee that low type users will perceive a low expected participation
payoff. The platform will use the access fee to extract all the surplus from the high type users. To
informally prove this state assume the platform will do the opposite, then high type users will reduce
their probability of being accepted, and so they will be less willing to participate. By providing
perfect information the platform will increase high type user’s gross expected participation payoff,
and so will his benefits because he can extract more surplus.
In the opposite situation only low type users will participate. The result here is trivial because
by construction low types will accept anyone no matter the signal they have. Platform’s decision in
this case will be to set any feasible signal, e.g. ρ ∈ Φλ∩ΨM . The following proposition summarizes
these two arguments.
Proposition 2. (i) If only high type users participate λ = 1 the profit maximizing platform will
provide perfect information, e.g. ρ∗ = 1, and will charge an access fee equal to a(1− c). (ii) If only
low type users participate λ = 0 the profit maximizing platform will provide noisy information, e.g.
ρ∗ = 1/2, and will charge an access fee equal to a(1− c).
Proof. Here we will provide an heuristic proof, the complete version is at the appendix. The first
bullet follows directly from showing the set of constraints from the accept/reject and participation
stages reduce to a singleton with 1 as its element, e.g. Φii1 = Φ
ii
Mixed,1 = Φ
i
1 = {1}. The second
bullet is trivial because the feasible set for ρ∗ is only constrained by assumption (1), e.g. [0.5, 1].
The platform will reduce the precision of the signal to guarantee high type users will not participate
and the correct allocation emerges.
The surplus maximizing signal coincides with the profit maximizing signal for the extreme par-
ticipation cases. This result is trivial because both platforms face the same optimization programs,
indeed the objective functions and the feasible sets are the same. The following corollary will
formally state this remark.
Corollary 1. If only high (or low) type users participate the surplus maximizing platform and the
profit maximizing platform will provide the same information, and charge the same access fee.
Proof. Trivial.
Now continue with the optimal signal when all users participate. Among all possible matching
equilibria we find one case where the signal do not affect the gross expected participation payoff.
The situation is the matching equilibrium when both types accept any partner they encounter
disregarding the signal they observe from them, i.e. Case (ii). This equilibrium indeed is the most
attractive because it embeds the highest possible activity level. The profit maximizing platform do
not need to use the signal for this situation because it does not affect users’ decision of accepting
any partner. The optimal signal in this case will lie at its feasible set ρ∗ ∈ Φii
λ
∩Ψii1 , see Figure (2).
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The signal do play a role in the rest of matching equilibria where both types participate. Indeed,
in matching equilibria Case (ii) Mixed and Case (i) the signal do affect the probability of forming
a match, then the profit maximizing platform decision is nontrivial. Starting with the case high
type users mix with low signal partners and accept any high signal partner, i.e. Case (ii) Mixed,
the main feature is the impact of the signal on the probability a high type user accepts a low
signal partner, e.g. σaα. The optimization program for this case will be, maxρ U
ii
m(a, λ, ρ) such that
ρ ∈ Φii
Mixed,λ
∩ΨiiMixed,1
25.
For the last matching equilibrium, e.g. Case (i), still information provision does not work as
a screening device. The access fee is the tool used by the platform to select which group of users
will participate into the matching environment. The optimization program for this case will be
maxρ U
i(a, λ, ρ), such that ρ ∈ Φi
λ
∩Ψi1
26.
Analysis here is simple because the gross expected participation payoff for low type users is
linear in the signal ρ. Then, the optimal information level must be either the highest or the lowest
possible. We will show that the best decision will be to provide the least feasible information level
because by doing this all low type users will participate, and by construction we know that if all
low type users participate then all high type users will also participate.
The following proposition summarizes the optimal signal rule given both type of users decide
to participate,
Proposition 3. Assume all users participate λ = λ. (i) For the matching equilibrium with the
highest “economic activity”, e.g. Case (ii), the profit maximizing platform will provide any feasible
level of information, e.g ρ∗ ∈ Φii
λ
∩ Ψii1 . (ii) For the second highest ranked matching equilibrium,
e.g. Case (ii) Mixed, the optimal (interior) provision satisfies the following rule:
ξσ∗aα,ρ =
1− σ∗aα
σ∗aα
where ξσ∗aα,ρ is the elasticity of the σ
∗
aα with respect to ρ. (iii) For the matching equilibrium Case
(i) its optimal to provide the least feasible level of information.
Proof. See the appendix.
Socially Optimal Signal. We pose two questions. First, which is the optimal information
provision level for a surplus maximizing platform ? And, which are the differences vis-a-vis the profit
25The feasible set of signals is for this matching equilibrium will be the intersection of Φii
Mixed,λ
= {ρ ∈ (0.5, 1] :
0 ≥ (ac− a)(1−λ)(2ρ− 1) ≥ a(1−c)
(1−ρ)a(1−c)
[ρ2(ac− a)(1−λ)+ a(1− c)(1− ρ)(1− ρ− ρλ)], ac−a
a(1−c)
ρ(1−λ)
(1−ρ)2λ
− ρ
1−ρ
∈ [0, 1]}
and ΨiiMixed,1 = {ρ ∈ (0.5, 1] : U
ii
m(a, λ, ρ) ≥ 0}.
26The feasible set of signal for this matching equilibrium will be the intersection of Φi
λ
= {ρ ∈ (0.5, 1] : a(1− c)[(1−
ρ)2λ+ ρ(1− λ)] ≥ a(1− c)(1− ρ)ρλ+ (a− ac)ρ(1− λ), λ(1− c)[aρ− a(1− ρ)]− c(1− λ)(a− a) ≥ 0, a(1− c)ρ2λ+
(a− ac)(1− ρ)(1− λ) ≥ 0, a(1− c)ρ(1− ρ)λ+ (a− ac)ρ(1− λ) ≤ 0}
and Ψi1 = {ρ ∈ (0.5, 1] : U
i(a, λ, ρ) ≥ 0}.
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maximizing platform. The obvious difference lies on while the former cares about the inframarginal
users, the latter only care for the marginal users. Platform’s objective now will be to find the optimal
level of information provision that maximizes the weighted sum of the gross expected participation
payoff from both type of individual, where the weights are their proportion in the population, e.g.
max
ρ∈Φ
λ
∩Ψ1
λU(a, λ, ρ) + (1− λ)U(a, λ, ρ)
We find a trivial solution for the highest ranking matching equilibrium. In this equilibrium
“economic activity” is the highest because every one is willing to accept any partner they meet,
naturally then the signal does not affect at all users’ behavior. The surplus maximizing platform
will be indifferent between any feasible signal, i.e. ρ∗ ∈ Φii
λ
∩Ψii1 . The optimal signal for the other
two matching equilibria is also non-trivial. With the second highest ranked matching equilibrium,
e.g. Case (ii) Mixed, the optimal signal rule must include the elasticity of the probability a high
type user accepts a low signal parter with respect to the signal, ξσaα . The signal that maximizes
social surplus will differ from the one from the profit maximizing platform because the latter only
considers the impact of the signal on one type of users, e.g. those with the lowest gross expected
participation payoff. A similar argument holds for the last matching equilibrium to considers.
The following proposition formally states the optimal signal level for a surplus maximizing
platform.
Proposition 4. Assume all users participate λ = λ. (i) For the highest ranked matching equi-
librium, e.g. Case (ii), the surplus maximizing platform will make the same decision as the profit
maximizing platform. (ii) For the second highest ranked matching equilibrium, e.g. Case (ii) Mixed,
the optimal (interior) signal satisfies the following rule:
ξσ∗aa,ρ = ω(ρ)
(
1− σ∗aα
σ∗aα
)
− (1− ω(ρ))
[
σ∗aα + ρ(1− σ
∗
aα)
σ∗aα
+
ac− a
a(1− c)
1− λ
λ
1
σ∗aα
]
where ξσ∗aα,ρ is the elasticity of the σ
∗
aα with respect to ρ, and ω(ρ) =
aPr{a}
aPr{a,α}+aPr{a} . (iii) For the
matching equilibrium Case (i) the optimal (interior) signal will satisfy:
ρ =
1− λ
λ
(
2a− (a+ a)c
2a(1− c)
)
Proof. See the appendix.
Propositions (3) and (4) let us identify and analyze the differences between the surplus maximiz-
ing and the profit maximizing platform. Without loss of generality consider the optimal information
provision rule for the second best ranked matching equilibrium, e.g. Case (ii) Mixed. While on
the left hand side of both equations we have the elasticity of σ∗aα wrt ρ, on the right hand side we
observe two differences. The first one is an additional term for the surplus maximizing platform,
which we will name as Within Group Effect (WGE), and represents the marginal effect of the signal
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on the gross expected participation payoff of high type user. Moreover we observe this effect has
a negative sign. The second difference between both equations are the weights attached to the
marginal effects of the signal on the gross expected participation payoff.
The WGE is not a new object in economics, its sign though provides us more intuition. From
standard IO text books we know the WGE is explained by the different objective functions surplus
maximizing and profit maximizing platforms have, while the former care about the inframarginal
user participating, the latter care about the marginal user. The fact WGE has a negative sign tells
us the surplus maximizing platform will place the optimal information provision level where the
elasticity of σaα is lower compared to the optimal profit maximizing information provision level.
Before moving forward with the analysis it is interesting to establish if there exists any over/un-
der provision of information given a fixed participation level. From proposition (3) we learned that
only in two matching equilibria the surplus maximizing and profit maximizing platform will take
different decisions, e.g. Case (ii) Mixed and Case (i). The answer to this question very much
depends which matching equilibrium we are looking at.
Consider Case (ii) Mixed with full participation. If the platform believes that high type users will
accept with some probability low signal partners, the profit maximizing platform will be interested
in increasing the demand for users receiving a low signal, and this will be done by providing as
much information as possible. On the other hand, the surplus maximizing platform will not be so
eager in providing as much information as before because doing so reduces low type users chances of
forming a match. In other words, while the surplus maximizing platform is interested in increasing
the provision of information to benefit both type of users, the profit maximizing platform wishes
to increase the provision to benefit more high type users.
In the other matching equilibrium, e.g. Case (i), with full participation, the result is the
opposite. Indeed, if the platform believes high type users will never accept a low signal partner the
surplus maximizing platform can approximate to perfect assortative match, where high types and
low types only match with their peers, by providing perfect information if possible. On the other
hand, the profit maximizing platform is less concerned about perfect sorting, and thus will provide
less information.
The following propositions states formally the arguments,
Proposition 5. Assume all users participate λ = λ. The profit maximizing platform will over-
provide information in relation to the surplus maximizing platform, e.g. ρprivate ≥ ρsurplus, when-
ever the high type user accepts low signal partners with a positive probability. If the high type user
always rejects low signal partners, now the profit maximizing platform will under-provide informa-
tion.
Proof. See appendix.
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4.1.2 Partial Group Participation
The provision of information plays a crucial role for the screening in these cases. Consider the
example where the platform wishes that all high type users participate, but only a fraction of low
types participate. In the previous section we showed that to achieve this the information provision
should be fixed at a level such that the net expected participation payoff for low type users is
exactly zero, e.g. ρ such that U(a, λ, ρ) = P and λ = λ
λ+A
. Previous literature on information
provision do not emphasize on this new role because they do not let users decide to participate or
not into the environment.
A platform that wishes to achieve a partial group participation outcome will affect the matching
equilibrium. As we shown in the previous section only two matching equilibria support partial
participation, e.g. Case (i) and Case (ii) Mixed. Is not a coincidence these two matching equilibria
share this feature, they are the only cases where the platform can affect the probability a user has
to be accepted and form a match.
Private Optimal λ. The optimization program is very simple. If we analyze the situation where
all highs participate but only “a fraction” of lows does, then by construction we know the net
expected participation payoff for low types is equal to zero, and for high types is non-negative.
As the expected participation payoffs satisfy U(a, λ, ρ) ≥ P = U(a, λ, ρ), the access fee will be
increased up to the point where U(a, λ, ρ) = P . The platform will pick a provision of information
level (ρ) such that U(a, λ, ρ) = P = U(a, λ, ρ).
The profit maximizing platform will determine the participation level A ∈ [0, 1− λ] that maxi-
mizes the revenue because costs are normalized to zero. More formally, the optimization program
will be maxA∈Φλ∩ΨM (λA)U(a, λ, ρ(A)) where λ =
λ
λ+A
and ρ ≡ ρ(A).
For the other partial participation case, where “a fraction” of high types participate and all low
types participate, the platform determines the participation level A ∈ [0, λ] that maximize also the
revenues. By construction this object is (A+ (1− λ))U(a, λ, ρ(A)) where λ = A
A+(1−λ)
and ρ(A) is
the level of information that guarantee U(a, λ, ρ) = P = U(a, λ, ρ).
The following proposition describes the interior solution for both partial group participation
cases,
Proposition 6. (i) The profit maximizing platform will extract the gross expected participation
payoff from the high type and low type users that participate. (ii) If all high types participate and
a fraction of low types participate, the optimal (interior) mass of lows in the platform satisfy
ξρ(A),A = −
(
1− ρ(A)
ρ(A)
)
(2ρ(A)− 1)
where ρ satisfies U(a, λ, ρ) = U(a, λ, ρ), where λ = λ
λ+A
, and where ξρ(A),A is the elasticity of ρ(A)
with respect to A. (iii) If a fraction of high types participate and all low types participate, the
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optimal (interior) mass of highs in the platform satisfy
ξρ(A),A =
1− ρ(A)
ρ(A
where ρ satisfies U(a, λ, ρ) = U(a, λ, ρ), where λ = 1−λ
A+1−λ
, and where ξρ(A),A is the elasticity of
ρ(A) with respect to A.
Proof. See appendix.
Platform’s decision determine which matching equilibrium is observed, in particular, in the
appendix we show each partial group participation case can be supported by only one matching
equilibrium. The first case in Proposition (6) we show is supported by the matching equilibrium
where high type users accept high signal partners, but mix with low signal partners, e.g. Case
(ii) Mixed. The second case in Proposition (6) we show is supported by the matching equilibrium
where high type users only accept high signal partners, e.g. Case (i).
The surplus maximizing platform decision is the same as in Proposition (6). Without loss
of generality focus on the case where all high types participate but a fraction of low type users
participate. Here the surplus from all high types users will be λU(a, λ, ρ), where the fraction of
highs in the platform is λ = λ
λ+A
, the mass of lows is A ≤ 1−λ, and where the information provision
is fixed at a level ρ such that U(a, λ, ρ) = U(a, λ, ρ). On the other hand, the surplus from the low
types will be AU(a, λ, ρ), but by construction it turns out to be AU(a, λ, ρ). The total surplus will
be (λ+A)U(a, λ, ρ) which is the same revenue a profit maximizing platform faces in this case.
Corollary 2. The surplus maximizing platform and the profit maximizing platform take the same
decisions in the partial participation cases
4.2 Optimal Menu
The optimal menu of access fee and information provision, e.g. (P, ρ), can be established by compar-
ing the profits/surplus obtained from all possible levels of participation, λ ∈ {1, 0, λ, λ
λ+A
, A
A+(1−λ)
},
at every point in the parameter space ∆a, λ, and c. A priori we do not know if it is optimal to a
platform to keep some high type or low type users, also we do not know if it is optimal to induce
the partial participation of one of the groups.
From hereon our interests are twofold. First, we will analyze if it is optimal to exclude either
the low or the high type users at a given point in the parameter space. Secondly, we will be do
some comparative statics on the set of optimal menus.
The main results are also twofold. First, that either the profit and the surplus maximizing
platforms will find optimal to propose menus where only high type users, or both type of users
decide to participate. In other words, these platforms will not be interested in excluding high type
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users from the platform. Additionally, this is line with what others, such as Johnson & Myatt 2006,
have found in models with related contexts.
The second result is about the comparative statics. Borrowing Johnson & Myatt’s terminology,
we will call an Informative Menu that where only high or low type users are willing to participate,
and Hype Menu that were both type of users are willing to participate. We will show that the higher
is the heterogeneity in the population ∆a, the bigger will be the region, at parameter space (λ, c),
that support the Information Menu for high type users. In short, the higher the heterogeneity the
bigger the incentives for the platform to only let participate high type users.
Private Optimal Menus. Assuming every user participates, only the two highest ranked match-
ing equilibrium may emerge. This is by no means a surprise because, the platform has strong incen-
tives to increase the probability any user with a low signal to be accepted by his randomly assigned
partner. In other words, either the platform will keep the highest ranked matching equilibrium, or
he will pick the right level of information such that the probability a high type accepts a low signal
partner (σaα) approaches to one. This logic cannot be applied to matching equilibrium Case (i)
and Case (i) Mixed.
Figure (28) in the appendix shows, for a given level of heterogeneity, the region where matching
equilibrium Case (ii) Mixed prevail over the highest ranked equilibrium Case (ii). Additionally, in
a comparative statics exercise, we observe a decrease in the population heterogeneity will reduce
the shaded are to the left. For the extreme situation with a very small heterogeneity most of the
parameter space (λ, c) will support the highest ranked matching equilibrium.
Finally, we must figure out where the Informative Menus, with either low or high type users,
prevail over the Hype Menu, where every user participates and the platform provides a partly
informative signal. Though a priori is unclear the comparison between the Informative Menu with
the high types and the Hype Menu, we can argue the platform will not find optimal an Informative
Menu with low type users.
If the fraction of high type users in the population λ is low, the profit maximizing platform
still will prefer to include high type users. For this region an Informative Menu with low types
yields higher profits than a similar Menu with hight types because the profit with the latter is
(1 − λ)a(1 − c), and with the former is λa(1 − c), then if λ is lower than a/(a + a), the platform
will keep on board only low type users. On the other hand, from Figure (28) we know that also
for low values of λ (and for most values of c) the platform will use matching equilibrium Case
(ii) Mixed to get on board every user. The profit maximizing platform must choose between only
accepting low type users, which yields a profit of (1 − λ)a(1 − c), or accepting every user, which
yields a profit of U iiM (a, λ, ρ
∗). Now is easier to posit the platform will prefer the Hype Menu over
the Informative Menu with low types because with the former an extra mass of users, equivalent
to λ, are participating, and this effect outweighs any possible reduction in the access fee.
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If the fraction of high type users in the population is rather high, it is also optimal to keep on
board high type users. In this case the platform has two possible comparisons to make. Either he
is choosing between the participation of every user, but now under the highest ranked matching
equilibrium, with yields a profit of a(1 − c), or the participation of only low types, which yield a
profit equal to (1 − λ)a(1 − c), or he is considering to include only high type users, which yields
a profit equal to λa(1 − c). In both cases its clear that the profit maximizing platform will have
incentives to let in high type users.
The following theorem summarizes all what has been said in the previous paragraphs.
Theorem 1. (i) The profit maximizing platform will not offer the Informative Menu for low type
users, (ii) There will be a unique optimal menu for each point in the parameter space (∆a, λ, c), and
(iii) Only Case (ii) Mixed matching equilibrium could be optimally supported at the Hype Menu.
Proof. See the appendix.
The following figure shows the regions, in the parameter space (λ, c) and given a small value
of ∆a, where either the Hype Menu or the Informative Menu with high types will appear. There
we show that for high values of λ, and not too high values of c27, the profit maximizing platform
will prefer to offer the Informative Menu for high type users (dark area). As mentioned before
this menu charges an access fee equal to a(1− c), and provides full information. As for the rest of
the parameter space, the platform will propose the Hype Menu, there every user in the population
participates by paying an access fee equal to the gross expected participation payoff from low type
users, and the platform will provide a partially informative signal
Figure 8: ∆a Small
The previous theorem highlights the motivation behind the profit maximizing platform’s deci-
sions. In plain words, the platform wants to design an environment such that users’ gross expected
participation payoff is enlarged as much as possible because this will raise platform’s profits. We
have seen that the better the signal the higher the participation payoff for high type users, but this
27To be more precise, the higher is λ also the higher the opportunity cost could be.
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is not necessarily true for low type users because they benefit from noisy signals. Then, if the profit
maximizing platform prefers having only the high type users he will enlarge their participation pay-
off by providing more information, and latter will set the access fee to extract it all. In addition, if
the platform faces other environment characteristics such that he wishes to keep on board all users,
he can do so by charging a smaller access fee and providing a less informative signal. In this new
situation the information is not the ideal for any type of user, high type users would have preferred
a perfectly informative signal and the low types would have preferred a purely noisy signal.
Lets say a few more words about why the Informative Menu for low types is not optimal. We
argued that the only region this menu could turn optimal is when the fraction of high type users
in the population (λ) is low enough, but we showed that the profit maximizing platform will prefer
to include additional high type users. To be more precise, the platform faces two opposing effects
associated to the inclusion of these type uses. If every user participates there is a volume effect
explained by the λ mass of new participants, but also will have a (negative) revenue effect because
the access fee will be reduced. Assumption (4) plays a key role in choosing which effect is the
dominant one, in our model the volume effect will dominate the revenue effect.
Socially Optimal Menus. Platforms in this case will take different decisions because they
care for the surplus of all participating users. As with the previous analysis we are interested in
characterizing the set of optimal menus in the parameter space (λ, c). We also restrain the analysis
to full group participation cases to compare the results in Theorem (1), latter we will comment on
the possibility of including partial group participation.
Focusing the attention on the full group participation cases, e.g. λ ∈ {0, λ, 1}, the analysis do
not qualitatively differ from what we obtained with the profit maximizing platform. Indeed, in this
situation still its optimal always to include high type users into the environment. To see why this
is the case imagine again the fraction of high type users in the population is “low enough”, e.g.
λ < a/(a+a), so the platform faces the decision of keeping only low type users and reach a surplus
of (1−λ)a(1−c), or let every user participates and reach a surplus of λU(a, λ, ρ∗)+(1−λ)U(a, λ, ρ∗),
where ρ∗ satisfy the optimality condition described in the previous section. Again, the platform
will contrast a positive volume effect associated to the mass λ of new participants, and a negative
effect (previously mentioned as revenue effect) explained by the fact low type’s participation payoff
will be reduced. Assumption (4) is crucial here to determine that the volume effect will outweigh
the negative effect.
The following theorem will formally state the result,
Theorem 2. Restrain λ to {0, λ, 1}. The surplus maximizing platform’s set of optimal menus
will not be qualitatively different from that in Theorem (1), that is, (i) its not optimal to offer the
Informative Menu for low type users, (ii) there is a unique menu for each point in the parameter
space (∆a, λ, c), and (iii) in the Hype Menu users will use matching equilibrium Case (ii) Mixed.
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Proof. Omitted because its a repetition of Theorem (1)’s proof.
If the information provision does not work as a screening tool we cannot make a general state-
ment about the over/under provision of information. Despite this, we can conclude the profit
maximizing platform will optimally over-provide information, vis-a-vis the benchmark, as long as
both platforms offer the Hype Menu. Also we can conclude that if the profit maximizing platform
offers the Hype Menu and the surplus maximizing platform offers the Informative Menu for the
high type users, the former platform will now under-provide information because in the benchmark
case signal is fully informative.
The following figures show the region, on the parameter space (λ, c) and given a medium value
of ∆a, where Hype and Informative Menus prevail. We observe that the Hype Menu (dark region)
is located at the east of the regions.
Figure 9: Profit Max., ∆a Medium
Figure 10: Surplus Max, ∆a
Medium
Its important to remark its not socially optimal to provide full information when all users
participate. We tend to think the surplus maximizing platform have strong incentives to provide
full information hoping high type users only match with their peers. But in this environment users
cannot use transfer to efficiently divide their matching surplus. Then, the surplus maximizing
platform internalize this externality and choose to provide a partially informative signal.
To finish the characterization of the set of optimal menus we proceed with the comparative
statics. The most important element will the the heterogeneity of users in the population, e.g.
∆a. In particular, we observe that the higher is the heterogeneity the bigger will be the region, in
the parameter space (λ, c), supporting the Hype Menu. Intuitively this result is straight forward
because any platform will have stronger incentives to only let high types participate, the bigger the
gap between users’ types. To conclude, if we take for example Figure (9), we can obtain that the
higher the heterogeneity, the bigger will be the dark region.
Corollary 3. The region, in the parameter space (λ, c), where the Hype Menu is optimal is positively
related with the population heterogeneity, e.g. ∆a
This last corollary shows an unexpected relationship with the literature on information pro-
vision. Johnson & Myatt (2006) found that a key determinant about what sort of advertising a
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monopolist should offer is the heterogeneity of the consumers. In particular, they observe that if
the heterogeneity is high the optimal advertising should target selected groups in the population
(Hype), but if heterogeneity is low the optimal advertising should target the average consumer
(Informative). Our model predictions follow the same spirit.
To complete the analysis we must consider the situation where any platform wishes to induce
partial group participation. This situation arises when the information provision works as a screen-
ing tool. Qualitative results up to now will not change, and the question which remains to be
answered is if its optimal for the profit or surplus maximizing platform to offer a menu that induces
the partial participation of one of the groups. In line with the results obtained so far we posit this
model should predict it is only optimal to offer a menu were all high type users participate and
only a fraction of low type users participate.
5 Extension: Two-Sided Platform
Until now we focused on a “one-sided” platform which is either incapable to distinguish which group
users belong to, and/or is uninterested to discriminate between users according to their group of
origin. In this particular situation we learned that in the presence of heterogeneous network effects
the platform must use the access fee and the information provision to attain each point of his
demand. Also we learned that the optimal set of menus do not exclude high type users, and that
the profit maximizing platform will over-provide information compared to the surplus maximizing
platform.
What else can we learn in a “two-sided” platform ? One interesting aspect is that when the
heterogeneity of one side (a-users) is different from that of the other side (b-users). For example,
if the a-group is very heterogeneous and the b-group is very homogeneous any platform will tend
to keep on board only high type a-users, and any b-type user. Another interesting aspect is that
when one side of the market is bigger than the other. For example, in the labor market for skilled
workers in a developing country the mass of workers looking for a job will be smaller than the mass
of firms willing to hire them.
In this extension we will focus con that situation where the heterogeneity differs, e.g. ∆a 6= ∆b,
but the size of the populations is the same, e.g. Ma = M b = 1
28. Our goal will be to stress out
which insights from the “one-sided” platform are still valid in the “two-sided” platform, and which
not.
Model. The setup do not suffer any significant modification. We analyze again a one-period
game, the population of users is divided in two sides (A and B), and each side is partitioned in
28A broader analysis of the multi-sided platform is a matter of analysis in a companion paper. Interested readers
please visit the author’s web page.
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two subgroup of high and low users, e.g. a ∈ {a, a} and b ∈ {b, b}. The fraction of high a-users
and b-users in the population will be denoted by λa and λb. Finally, as well as in the “one-sided”
case, users who participate do not observe directly the objective characteristics from the randomly
assigned partner, instead they observe an informative signal which can either be high or low. To wit,
an a-user that participates will only observe a signal β{β, β} from his b-user partner. Analogously,
an b-user that participates will only observe a signal α{α,α} from his a-user partner.
To make a parallel with assumption (1) define first ρa and ρb as the probability a high a-users
and b-user receive, respectively, a high signal α and β. The assumption we know have to make is
Assumption 4. Let ρb > 1/2, and ρa > 1/2
Matching payoffs are such that high type a-users and b-users dislike forming a match with a
low type partner. As before, the benefits depend on who form the match, and the cost are type
specific. To fix ideas pick a high type a-users. His matching payoff will be b−ac only if his partner
has a high type, otherwise his payoff is b− ac. Then we must replace assumption (2) with,
Assumption 5. Let users a ∈ {a, a} and b ∈ {b, b} form a match, and let 1 be an indicator
function, then the payoff for user “a” will be 1a=a,b=bb+(1−1otherwise)b− ac, ad for user “b” will
be 1a=a,b=ba+ (1− 1otherwise)a− bc.
Finally, the crucial assumption we impose in the model is that high type a-users and b-users
only obtain a positive payoff when they form a match with one of their peers from the other side
of the market.
Assumption 6. Assume a− bc, b− ac > 0 > a− bc, b− ac
In line with the standard two-sided market literature we will allow the platform to establish a
different access fee for each group, e.g. P a and P b. Similarly, he will provide a different ρ for each
group, e.g. ρa and ρb. Finally, the strategies for the users and the platform are adapted to the
new setting. We will call σaβ (σbα) the probability an a-user (b-user) accepts a β-signal (α-signal)
partner, and γa (γb) the decision a user from side “A” (“B”) enter into the matching environment.
The platform’s strategy specifies the access fees, e.g. P a and P b, and the informativeness of the
signal, e.g. ρa and ρb. The timing remains unchanged
29.
Model’s Main Restriction. The main restriction our approach has is over the mass of a-users
and b-users in the population. Indeed we analyze the situation where both masses are equal and
normalized to one, i.e. Ma =M b = 1. The difference between both sides can be attributed to the
heterogeneity in the population, i.e. ∆a 6= ∆b.
29The graph is on the appendix.
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Matching Equilibrium. The expected payoff of accepting, say for an a-user, after participating
and given all available information will be
v(β, a) = (b− ac)Pr{b | β}
[
Pr{α | a}σbα + Pr{α | a}σbα
]
+ (b− ac)Pr{b | β}
v(β, a) = (b− ac)
[
Pr{b | β}(Pr{α | a}σbα + Pr{α | a}σbα) + Pr{b | β}
]
Similarly, for an b-user will be
w(α, b) = (a− bc)Pr{a | α}
[
Pr{β | b}σaβ + Pr{β | b}σaβ
]
+ (a− bc)Pr{a | α}
w(α, b) = (a− bc)
[
Pr{a | α}(Pr{β | b}σaβ + Pr{β | b}σaβ) + Pr{a | α}
]
We can explicitly describe, within each side, the joint distribution of types and signal. For
the A-side we have Pr{a, α} = ρaλa, Pr{a, α} = (1 − ρa)λa, Pr{a, α} = (1 − ρa)(1 − λa) and
Pr{a, α} = ρa(1 − λa). For the B-side we will have Pr{b, β} = ρbλb, Pr{b, β} = (1 − ρb)λb,
Pr{b, β} = (1− ρb)(1 − λb) and Pr{b, β} = ρb(1− λb).
The multiplicity of equilibria now becomes more complex. As with the “one-sided” platform
we will obtain pure strategy and mixed strategy matching equilibria, but now the set of the former
will be bigger. Indeed, on top of obtaining a matching equilibrium where both high type a-users
and b-users accept every partner, e.g. Case (ii), and where the same users only accept high signal
partners and reject low signal partners, e.g. Case (i), we will obtain another case which we will call
“non-mirror” pure strategy matching equilibria (NM-Case). In this additional situation, while high
type a-users accept any randomly assigned partner, high type b-users will only accept high signal
partners and reject low signal partners. The opposite situation should also hold, while high type
b-users accept any partner, the high type a-users will only accept high signal randomly assigned
partners.
To fix ideas analyze the decision from a high type a-user. In the NM-Case where he only accepts
high signal partners but high type b-users accept everyone, the expected payoff of accepting, given
all available information, will be
v(β, a) = bPr{b | β}bPr{b | β} − ac T 0
In the opposite situation this same expression will be,
v(β, a) = (b− ac)Pr{b | β}Pr{α | a}+ (b− ac)Pr{b | β} T 0
it is possible to obtain a plot in the parameter space (ρb, λb), similar to those from the “one-sided”
platform, showing the region supporting this new matching equilibrium30.
The characterization of the set of matching equilibria is not different. In the case of a “one-
sided” platform we showed this set is a complete lattice and we can determine the greatest and
30All these details will be covered extensively in a companion paper.
36
the least among them. The key argument in favor of this result is that high users’ best response
correspondence is increasing. For the “two-sided” platform case still is true the best response
correspondence satisfy this condition.
Why should we expect that the set of matching equilibria in a “two-sided” platform is not a
complete lattice ? The complexity of the environment we analyze depends on the characteristics of
both sides, and in particular depends on the heterogeneity of the population on each side. If both
groups are not too different we would expect high type users from both side behaving alike, but if
they are different enough its likely that the matching equilibrium NM-Case becomes relevant.
Participation. The message we learned from the “one-sided” case is that to reach every point in
the platform’s demand we require from both the access fee and the information provision. Recall
that to induce those point in the demand with a participation of a fraction of high or low type users
we require the access fee and the information provision to jointly work in a particular way. This
insight is still valid for a “multi-sided” platform offering a NTU matching environment because to
show it we only need to assume that network effects are heterogeneous.
Pricing & Information Provision Rules. To compare the analytical results obtained in propo-
sitions (2) - (4) with those from a “two-sided” platform we must include the non-mirror matching
equilibrium (NM-Case). We will show that the only difference will arise with the Hype Menu.
The Informative Menus for high and low types are unchanged. If any platform wishes to keep
on board only the high type a-users and b-users the optimal menu requires charging access fees
that extract all their surplus. Additionally, the platform will provide a fully informative signal to
avoid low type a-users and b-users from participating. The Informative Menu for high types will
be (P a, P b, ρa, ρb) = (b − ac, a − b, 1, 1). On the other hand, if any platform wishes to keep on
board only the low type a-users and b-users he must pick the access fees that extract all user’s rent,
additionally he will provide a fully uninformative signal. The Informative Menu for low types will
be (P a, P b, ρa, ρb) = (b− ac, a− b, 1, 1).
The Hype Menu analysis is more interesting because of the Spence Effect. Like with the “one-
sided” case, the platform will pick an access fee that induces the participation of all users from
both sides. Additionally, he will provide a partially informative pair of signals because doing so
induces the high and low type of users to participate.
The following proposition formalizes the arguments in the previous two paragraphs,
Proposition 7. Let assumptions (4) - (6) hold. (i) The Informative Menus for high and low
types are the same as with a “one-sided” platform. The profit maximizing’s Hype Menu (ii.1) given
matching equilibrium Case (ii) will provide any feasible level of information, (ii.2) given matching
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equilibrium Case (ii) Mixed will provide a pair of signals satisfying,
ξσ∗
bα
ρa =
1− σ∗
bα
σ∗
bα
−
a− bc
b− ac
λaρbσ
∗
aβ
λbσbα
ξσaβρa
ξσ∗aβρb =
1− σ∗aβ
σ∗aβ
−
b− ac
a− bc
λbρaσ
∗
bα
λaσaβ
ξσbαρb
and (ii.3) given matching equilibrium Case (i) will provide the least informative pair feasible signals.
Proof. The proof is on Proposition’s (2) and (3) proof.
The extra term we find at the right hand side of both equations is what is defined in Weyl
(2010) as the Spence Effect. This effect will naturally appear in any other analytical result because
it represents the marginal revenue obtained through the other side of the market. In order to not
make a list the remaining analytical results we invite the reader to visit the appendix. In particular,
the proofs of propositions (3), (4) and (6) are done not for the “one-sided” platform, but for the
“two-sided” platform.
The complete analysis of the “two-sided” case requires tackling two final issues. On one hand,
we need to consider the cases where the platform wishes to induce partial group participation on
one side and full group participation on the other side. For example, any platform might consider
inducing participation of all high a-users and partial participation of low type a-users, and inducing
participation of both high and low type b-users. On the other hand, we need to characterize the
set of optimal menus for all the parameter space (∆a,∆b, λa, λb, c). Both of these issues are treated
in a companion paper.
6 Conclusion
This paper considers a firm that designs and offers, for a fixed price, a matching market/enviroment
to a population of vertically differentiated users. In addition, we acknowledge that these environ-
ments are not frictionless, and that the frictions are determined by the market design. The firm
we analyzed jointly determines the market design and its pricing. Broadly speaking the research
questions are twofold. First, how can the firm can jointly use the market design and pricing to
screen particular segments of the population, and second, characterize the set of optimal menus of
design and pricing.
Our approach restricts the matching environment and the “market creating” firm in several
ways. On the one hand, the environment has two main properties. Users forming a match cannot
use transfers to efficiently divide the surplus generated by the match, and users can only observe a
signal from their randomly assigned partner’s type after paying an access fee. On the other hand,
the “market creating” firm will have two other main characteristics. The platform will pick the
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optimal level of access fee and information provision. And finally, we will assume that network
effects are heterogeneous, in particular while low type users care about forming a match, high type
users care about who they form a match with.
We propose two research questions. The first is to understand how a market creating firm
can use the pairing of the access fee and information provision to screen particular segments of the
population, and the second is to characterize the set of optimal menus of access fee and information
provision.
We show that with heterogeneous network effects the access fee is not enough for screening and
the platform must use the information provision to induce some levels of participation. Special
attention is devoted to understand how information provision helps screening. We also show that
the set of optimal menus of access fee and information provision rule out the possibility of excluding
high type users. In the case it is optimal to retain every user we find the optimal signal is partially
informative. Finally, we show that when both platforms decide to retain every user the profit
maximizing firm will over-provide information in relation to the surplus maximizing firm. To
complete the characterization we also look at some comparative statics. We observe that the
region in the parameter space where it is optimal to retain only the high type users increases with
the heterogeneity in the population, i.e. the difference between high and low types.
Within this framework there are several natural extensions worth analyzing. First, allow for
platform competition. This extension should be a priority as it will allow us to approach less
carefully the available data on platforms. We posit that the set of optimal menus will be strongly
determined by the need of the platform to increase the mass of participating users. Secondly,
allow for a second degree price discrimination within each group. We believe this extension is very
relevant because by giving more flexibility on the pricing tool the gap between the information
provided by the profit maximizing and surplus maximizing platform must shrink. Finally, we
believe that regulation-related questions represent an interesting path for future research. For
example, we could address again the topic of the Net Neutrality debate and study how regulations
on non-pricing tools changes the status quo of the debate.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Remarks & Tables
Remark (3)
The expected payoff of participation for Case (i) Mixed will be,
U im(a, λ, ρ) = 0
U im(a, λ, ρ) = a(1− c)(1− λ)
(
1−
(
a− ac
a− ac
)(
1− ρ
ρ
)2)
Participation decision is simple for this matching equilibrium. When high type users decide to participate,
(λ,M) = (1, λ), gross expected participation payoff for high and low types is zero, e.g. U im(a, 1, ρ) = 0 for
a ∈ {a, a}. This situation implies high types are not willing to participate as long as P > 0. When low
types decide to participate, (λ,M) = (0, 1 − λ), the gross expected participation payoff for low types is
U im(a, 0, ρ) = a(1 − c)
(
1 +
(
ac−a
a(1−c)
)(
1−ρ
ρ
)2)
, and for high types is zero; the usual access fee restriction
applies. Finally, the situation where both high and low types participate, e.g. (λ,M) = (λ, 1), yield a gross
expected participation payoff equal to U im(a, λ, ρ) and U
i
m(a, λ, ρ). But as we require that U
i
m(a, λ, ρ) ≥ P ,
again high types are not willing to participate as long as the access fee is nonnegative.
Figure 11: (λ, 1) Figure 12: (1, λ) Figure 13: (0, 1 − λ)
Figures (11) - (25) show only low type users are willing to participate into this matching equilibrium31.
Indeed, only figure (25) shows a region where some users, all of them from the low type, are willing to
participate.
A platform in this matching equilibrium can support only one partial participation situation. By
construction we know the gross expected participation payoff for low type users is strictly positive, e.g.
U im(a, λ, ρ) > 0, then is only possible to support a situation where all low types enter, but only a fraction of
high types participate. The condition to be attained will be U im(a, λ, ρ) = a(1−c)(1−λ)[1+
ac−a
a(1−c)(
1−ρ
ρ
)2] > 0,
where λ = A
A+(1−λ)
.
Remark (4)
Figures (14) - (16) show the cases when search costs are the minimum, e.g. c = a
a
. The first figure shows
the case where environments’ heterogeneity its significant (a >> a), the second shows a situation where
31As with the previous cases, the figure on the left shows the case both types are willing to participate, the figure in
the middle represent the case where only high types participate, and the figure on the right only low types participate.
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environment’s heterogeneity is not so accentuated (a > 2a), and the last a situation where environment’s
heterogeneity is the least (a ≈ 2a). We observe from the figures that only two matching equilibria arise,
one where high type users accept any partner ((1, 1)), and another where they reject low signal partners
and mix with high signal partners ((σaα, 0)). Also we observe that the region supporting (1, 1) increases as
search cost increases, and the reason is that the conditions such that high type users are more selective than
low type users are less stringent as search cost increases. Indeed, as search cost increases is easier that the
expected payoff from a high type user of accepting a low signal partner is smaller than the same expected
payoff but now from a low type user.
Figures (17) - (19) show the cases where search costs are important, but not too much. As in the
previous paragraph the first graph is when a >> a, the second when a > 2a, and the last when environment’s
heterogeneity is the minimum, e.g. a ≈ 2a. The first feature to outline is that all matching equilibria may be
supported if search costs are above the minimum level. In case cmin = a/a we cannot sustain the matching
equilibrium where high type users accept any partner they receive, e.g. (σaα, σaα) = (1, 1). Again, this result
happens because the expected payoff of accepting a low signal partner is higher for high type users than
low type users, which imply the former will not be more selective than low type users. The second feature
to outline, see Figures (18) - (19), is that while search cost increases the regions that supports matching
equilibria (1, σaα) and (1, 1) decreases, and region that supports matching equilibrium (1, 1) increases. This
feature is simply showing that as environment’s heterogeneity increases, high type users becomes less more
selective.
Last three figures show the situation when search costs are significant high. These cases provided no
additional insights.
Timing for the Two-Sided Platform.
At the beginning, (i) the nature determines the fraction of high type a-users and b-users in the population,
and every user privately learn their type. Then (ii), the platform determines P a, P b and ρa, ρb. At the
next step, (iii) all a-users and b-users decide to enter or stay out of the environment. Among those that
participate, (iv) users from one side randomly meet another user from the other side. All b-users and a-users
learn α and β respectively. Now within each pair, (v) users decide to accept or not their randomly assigned
partner. A match is formed when both types accept each other.
7.2 Omitted Proofs
Lemma 1 . Let assumptions (1) - (3) hold. Then, v(α, a) > v(α, a) and v(α, a) ≤ v(α, a).
Proof. We will show that v(α, a) > v(α, a) (named as first condition from hereon), and v(α, a) < v(α, a)
(named as second conditions from hereon) for every matching equilibrium.
In matching equilibrium Case (i)
v(α, a) = a(1 − c)Pr{a | α}Pr{α | a}+ (a− ac)Pr{a | α} (3)
v(α, a) = a(1 − c)[Pr{a | α}Pr{α | a}+ Pr{a | α}] (4)
the first condition boils down to (2ρ− 1)(1− λ) > 0 and is satisfied by assumption (1), similarly the second
condition is satisfied as it turns to Pr{α | a}(Pr{a | α} − Pr{a | α}) < 0.
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Figure 14: c = a/a Figure 15: c = a/a Figure 16: c = a/a
Figure 17: c = 0.6 Figure 18: c = 0.6 Figure 19: c = 0.6
Figure 20: c = 0.9 Figure 21: c = 0.9 Figure 22: c = 0.9
Figure 23: Two-Sided Platform Timing
For the matching equilibrium where high types access any partner, i.e. Case (ii)
v(α, a) = a(1− c)Pr{a | α} + (a− ac)Pr{a | α} (5)
v(α, a) = a(1− c) (6)
the first condition is (a− a)(2ρ− 1) > 0 and is also satisfied by assumption (1). Second condition makes no
sense in this case because the probability a low type of forming a match is equal to one.
For the matching equilibrium where high type users accept high signal partners, and mix with low signal
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partners, i.e. Case (ii) Mixed
v(α, a) = a(1− c)Pr{a | α}[Pr{α | a}+ Pr{α | a}σaα] + (a− ac)Pr{a | α} (7)
v(α, a) = a(1− c)[Pr{a | α}(Pr{α | a}+ Pr{α | a}σaα) + Pr{a | α}] (8)
the first conditions becomes [a(1 − c)(Pr{α | a} + Pr{α | a}σ∗aα) − (a − ac)](Pr{a | α} − Pr{a | α}) > 0,
where σ∗aα satisfies v(α, a) = 0. Here is immediate to show assumption (1) is enough to satisfy the inequality.
The second condition boils down to guarantee that Pr{a | α}(Pr{α | a} + Pr{α | a}σ∗aα) + Pr{a | α} <
Pr{a | α}(Pr{α | a}+ Pr{α | a}σ∗aα) + Pr{a | α} which again is satisfied by assumption (1).
Finally, for the matching equilibrium where high types reject low signal partners, and mix with high
signal partners, i.e. Case (i) Mixed
v(α, a) = a(1− c)Pr{a | α}Pr{α | a}σ∗aα + (a− ac)Pr{a | α} (9)
v(α, a) = a(1− c)[Pr{a | α}Pr{α | a}σ∗aα + Pr{a | α}] (10)
where σ∗aα guarantees v(α, a) = 0. The first condition turns out to be equal to 0 >
ac−a
Pr{α}Pr{a,α} [Pr{a, α}Pr{a, α}−
Pr{a, α}Pr{a, α}], and assumption (1) guarantees the term is braces is negative. The second condition is
also trivially satisfied from assumption (1).
Proposition (1) . (i) The set of matching equilibria is nonempty, and we can determine “the greatest
and the least” matching equilibria. (ii) The set of matching equilibria is a nonempty complete lattice.
Proof. Low type users’ best response correspondence is trivial because they are willing to accept any partner
they encounter, e.g. Ωa(·) = {(1, 1)}. High type users’ best response correspondence is upper and lower
increasing given each region of Figure (6. Without loss of generality analyze the pairs (ρ, λ) that belong
to region C from that figure. For any σ′ ∈ [0, 1]2 there exist a least (greatest) element that belong to
Ωa(σ
′; ρ, λ). For example, if σ′ = (1, σaα), we can verify that (1, σaα) ∨ (0, 0) = (1, σaα) ∈ Ωa(σ
′; ρ, λ), and
similarly (1, σaα) ∧ (0, 0) = (0, 0) ∈ Ωa(σ
′; ρ, λ). Finally, using Calciano’s (2009) Theorem 2 we conclude
that the set of fixed points of the matching game is nonempty, and that there exist a greatest and least fixed
point.
We need to include a new piece of notation. As [0, 1]2 is a complete lattice, the greatest element of this
set using the usual vector ordering is (1, 1). For a fixed h ∈ [0, 1], define the correspondence (which may be
empty) Ωh,a(σ; ρ, λ) : [h, 1]
2 ⇉ [h, 1]2 as
Ωh,a(σ; ρ, λ) = Ωa(σ; ρ, λ) ∩ [h, 1]
2
Due to the simple structure of high type users’ best reply correspondence, for every (h, h) ∈ {σ ∈ [0, 1]2 :
Ωa(σ; ρ, λ) ∩ [σa·,+∞)
2 6= 0}, the correspondence Ωh,a has a least element whenever nonempty. Indeed, in
our case {σ ∈ [0, 1]2 : Ωa(σ; ρ, λ) ∩ [σa·,+∞)
2 6= 0} = {(1, 1)}, so Ω1,a = {(1, 1)} and there exist a least
element. Finally, using Calciano’s (2009) Theorem 3 we conclude the set of fixed points of the matching
game is a complete lattice.
Proposition (2) . (i) If only high type users participate λ = 1 the profit maximizing platform will
provide perfect information, e.g. ρ∗ = 1, and will charge an access fee equal to a(1− c). (ii) If only low type
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users participate λ = 0 the profit maximizing platform will provide noisy information, e.g. ρ∗ = 1/2, and
will charge an access fee equal to a(1− c).
Proof. We will proceed showing that in every matching equilibrium, when only high type users participate
the optimal decision for any platform is to eliminate any noise from the signal ρ∗ = 1, and that when only
low type users participate the optimal decision for any platform is to provide a completely noisy signal, e.g.
ρ∗ = 1/2.
Lets start with the matching equilibrium where the high type users only accept high signal partners,
and reject low signal partners, i.e. Case (i). If only high type users participate, λ = 1, the set of feasible
information provision levels will be
Φi1 = {ρ ∈ [0.5, 1] : a(1− c)(1 − ρ)
2 − a(1− c)(1− ρ)ρ ≥ 0,
a(1 − c)ρ− a(1− c)(1 − ρ) ≥ 0,
a(1 − c)ρ2 ≥ 0, a(1− c)ρ(1 − ρ) ≤ 0}
Notice the last restriction is only satisfied when ρ = 1, the other restrictions are satisfied at this level. Then,
the feasible of ρ’s reduces to a singleton. In the opposite situation, when only low type users participate,
λ = 0, the set of feasible ρ’s is not determined by those restriction coming from the high type users. Then,
any platform will pick a ρ belonging to [0.5, 1]. Moreover, as neither the profit nor the surplus of those users
participating depend on the signal level, because the probability of being accepted is equal to one, then
platforms do not care on the signal’s informativeness. Finally, under the realistic assumption information
provision is costly, the optimal information provision level is the lowest possible, then ρ = 1/2.
Continue with the matching equilibrium where high types accept any partner they encounter, i.e. Case
(ii). In case only high type users participate, λ = 1, the set of feasible signals comes to
Φii1 = {ρ ∈ [0.5, 1] : −(1− ρ)λ(a− a)(1− c) ≥ 0
(a− a)(1− c) ≥ 0
a(1− c)(1 − ρ) ≥ 0}
and notice that the first restriction is satisfied only when ρ = 1. On the other hand, if only low type users
participate the feasible set of signals remains on the original interval determined by assumption (1), because
the restrictions coming from the high type users do not apply.
Continue with the matching equilibrium where high types accept high signal partners and mix with low
signal partners, i.e. Case (ii) Mixed. In the case only high type users participate, i.e. λ = 1, the set of
feasible signal will be
ΦiiMixed,1 = {ρ ∈ [0.5, 1] : 0 ≥ a(1− c)(1 − 2ρ),−
ρ
1− ρ
∈ [0, 1]}
The second constraint will not hold because by assumption (1) the least level of ρ is 1/2, and consequently
this set is empty. The intuition is straightforward, if only high type users participate makes no sense for
them to mix. On the other hand, if only low type users participate the feasible set of ρ’s is only constrained
by assumption (1). The optimal decision for any platform will be to provide a pure noisy signal because
neither the profit nor the surplus depends on ρ, and because information provision is usually is not costless.
Finally, lets move to the matching equilibrium where high type users reject low signal partners, and mix
with high signal partners, i.e. Case (i) Mixed. If only high type users participate, λ = 1, the set of feasible
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signals is trivially satisfied because this set becomes ΦiMixed,1 = {ρ ∈ [0.5, 1] : 0 ∈ [0, 1]}. This matching
equilibrium is not interesting because high type users expected participation payoff is by construction equal
to zero, additionally it is at the bottom of the ranking of equilibria. On the other hand, if only low type
users participate, λ = 0, the arguments are the same. The set of feasible signals is only constrained by
assumption (1), and any platform will optimally provide pure noisy signals, i.e. ρ = 1/2.
Proposition (3) . Assume all users participate λ = λ. (i) For the matching equilibrium with the
highest “economic activity”, e.g. Case (ii), the profit maximizing platform will provide any feasible level
of information, e.g ρ∗ ∈ Φii
λ
∩ Ψii1 . (ii) For the second highest ranked matching equilibrium, e.g. Case (ii)
Mixed, the optimal (interior) provision satisfies the following rule:
ξσ∗
aα
,ρ =
1− σ∗aα
σ∗aα
where ξσ∗
aα
,ρ is the elasticity of the σ
∗
aα with respect to ρ. (iii) For the matching equilibrium Case (i) its
optimal to provide the least feasible level of information.
Proof. In this case we will discuss the optimal provision of information for every matching equilibrium, given
all users participate, e.g. M = 1. The analysis here will be performed for the more general setup where the
platform is fully two-sided. The additional notation is described at Section 6.
Lets start with the highest ranked matching equilibrium, i.e. Case (ii). The set of feasible signal will be
Φii
λaλb
⋂
Ψii1 , where
Φii
λaλb
= {(ρa, ρb) ∈ [0.5, 1]
2 : −(1− ρb)λb((b − b)− (a− a)c) ≥ 0,
(b− b)− (a− a)c ≥ 0,−(1− ρa)λa((a− a)− (b− b)c) ≥ 0,
(a− a)− (b − b)c ≥ 0,
(b− ac)(1 − ρb) ≥ 0, (a− bc)(1− ρa) ≥ 0}
Ψii1 = {(ρa, ρb) ∈ [0.5, 1]
2 : U ii(a, λb, ρa, ρb) ≥ U
ii(a, λb, ρa, ρb),
U ii(b, λa, ρa, ρb) ≥ U
ii(b, λa, ρa, ρb)}
= {(ρa, ρb) ∈ [0.5, 1]
2 : bλb + b(1 − λb)− ac ≥ b− ac,
aλa + a(1− λa)− bc ≥ a− bc}
The optimization program will be
max
(ρa,ρb)∈Φii
λaλb
⋂
Ψii
1
b− ac+ a− bc
The profit maximizing provision level is not uniquely determined because the profit function is indepen-
dent on both signals. In case the provision is costly, the platform will optimally provide noisy signals.
The second highest matching equilibrium will yield an interior solution. The set of feasible signal will
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be Φii
Mixed,λaλb
⋂
ΨiiMixed,1, where
Φii
Mixed,λaλb
= {(ρa, ρb) ∈ [0.5, 1]
2 : (ac− b)(1− λb)(2ρb − 1) ≥
b− ac
(1− ρa)(b− ac)
[ρaρb(ac− b)(1− λb)
+ (b− ac)(1− ρb)(1− ρa − ρaλa)],
(bc− a)(1− λa)(2ρa − 1) ≥
a− bc
(1− ρb)(a− bc)
[ρbρa(bc− a)(1− λa) + (a− bc)(1 − ρa)(1− ρb − ρbλb)],
ac− b
b− ac
ρb(1− λb)
(1 − ρb)(1− ρa)λb
−
ρa
1− ρa
∈ [0, 1],
bc− a
a− bc
ρa(1− λa)
(1 − ρa)λa(1− ρa)
−
ρb
1− ρb
∈ [0, 1]}
The optimization program will be,
max
(ρa,ρb)∈Φii
Mixed,λaλb
⋂
Ψii
Mixed,1
U iiM (a, λb, ρa, ρb) + U
ii
M (b, λa, ρa, ρb)
= (b− ac)[λb((1 − ρa) + ρaσ
∗
bα
(ρa, ρb)) + (1 − λb)]
+ (a− bc)[λa((1 − ρb) + ρbσ
∗
aβ(ρa, ρb)) + (1− λa)]
where σ∗
bα
(·) is the probability a high type b-user accepts a low signal a-user such that v(α, b) = 0 for this
particular matching equilibrium; this function has two arguments, ρa and ρb. Similarly define σ
∗
aβ(·), and
this function’s arguments are ρa and ρb.
The interior solution is determined by the following first order conditions,
ρa
∂σ∗
bα
(ρa, ρb)
∂ρa
= 1− σ∗
bα
(ρa, ρb)−
(a− bc)λaρb
(b − ac)λb
∂σ∗aβ(ρa, ρb)
∂ρa
ρb
∂σ∗aβ(ρa, ρb)
∂ρb
= 1− σ∗aβ(ρa, ρb)−
(b − ac)λbρa
(a− bc)λa
∂σ∗
bα
(ρa, ρb)
∂ρb
Now define as ξσ∗
bα
ρa as the elasticity of σ
∗
bα
(ρa, ρb) with respect to ρa, and analogously define ξσ∗
aβ
ρb . The
first order conditions boils down to,
ξσ∗
bα
ρa =
1− σ∗
bα
σ∗
bα
−
a− bc
b− ac
λaρbσ
∗
aβ
λbσbα
ξσaβρa
ξσ∗
aβ
ρb =
1− σ∗aβ
σ∗aβ
−
b− ac
a− bc
λbρaσ
∗
bα
λaσaβ
ξσ
bα
ρb
If we restrict attention to a one-sided platform these equations further simplify. For this situation the
extra term is what Weyl (2010) calls as Spence Effect (SE), for the first equation is
−
a− bc
b− ac
λaρbσ
∗
aβ
λbσbα
ξσaβρa
and for the second equation is
−
b− ac
a− bc
λbρaσ
∗
bα
λaσaβ
ξσ
bα
ρb
The first order condition for the one-sided case will be,
ξσ∗
aα
ρ =
1− σ∗aα
σ∗aα
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Continue with the third highest ranked matching equilibrium where high types accept high signal users,
but rejects low signal partners, i.e. Case (i). The set of feasible signal will be Φi
λaλb
⋂
Ψi1, where
Φi
λaλb
= {(ρa, ρb) ∈ [0.5, 1]
2 : (b− ac)[(1 − ρb)λb(1− ρa) + ρb(1 − λb)]
− [(b− ac)(1 − ρb)λbρa + (b− ac)ρb(1 − λb)] ≥ 0,
(a− bc)[(1 − ρa)λa(1− ρb) + ρa(1− λa)]
− [(a− bc)(1 − ρa)λaρb + (a− bc)ρa(1− λa)] ≥ 0,
λb[(b− ac)ρa − (b− ac)(1 − ρa)]− c(1 − λb)(a− a) ≥ 0,
λa[(a− bc)ρb − (a− bc)(1 − ρb)]− c(1− λa)(b − b) ≥ 0,
(b− ac)ρbλbρa + (b− ac)(1 − ρb)(1 − λb) ≥ 0,
(b− ac)ρa(1− ρb)λb + (b− ac)ρb(1 − λb) ≤ 0,
(a− bc)ρaλaρb + (a− bc)(1 − ρa)(1− λa) ≥ 0,
(a− bc)(1 − ρa)λaρb + (a− bc)ρa(1− λa) ≥ 0}
and
Ψi1 = {(ρa, ρb) ∈ [0.5, 1]
2 : U i(a, λb, ρa, ρb) ≥ 0,
U i(b, λa, ρa, ρb) ≥ 0}
= {(ρa, ρb) ∈ [0.5, 1]
2 : (b − ac)[λb(1− ρa) + (1− λb)] ≥ 0,
(a− bc)[λa(1− ρb) + (1− λa)] ≥ 0}
The optimization program will be,
max
(ρa,ρb)∈Φi
λaλb
⋂
Ψi
1
U i(a, λb, ρa, ρb) + U
i(b, λa, ρa, ρb)
= (b− ac)[λb(1− ρa) + (1− λb)] + (a− bc)[λa(1− ρb) + (1− λa)]
and notice the program is linear in both arguments, then we face a bang-bang solution. The marginal profit
in both arguments is negative, then the optimal decision for the platform will be to pick the least feasible
level of provision. For example, the marginal profit wrt ρa is −(b− ac)λb < 0.
In the particular case of a one-sided platform the solution is analogous.
Finally, the solution for the lowest ranked matching equilibrium is not analyzed because we already
showed that whenever high type users participate, they will not use this equilibrium.
Proposition (4) . Assume all users participate λ = λ. (i) For the highest ranked matching equilibrium,
e.g. Case (ii), the surplus maximizing platform will make the same decision as the profit maximizing platform.
(ii) For the second highest ranked matching equilibrium, e.g. Case (ii) Mixed, the optimal (interior) signal
satisfies the following rule:
ξσ∗
aa
,ρ = ω(ρ)
(
1− σ∗aα
σ∗aα
)
− (1− ω(ρ))
[
σ∗aα + ρ(1− σ
∗
aα)
σ∗aα
+
ac− a
a(1 − c)
1− λ
λ
1
σ∗aα
]
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where ξσ∗
aα
,ρ is the elasticity of the σ
∗
aα with respect to ρ, and ω(ρ) =
aPr{a}
aPr{a,α}+aPr{a} . (iii) For the matching
equilibrium Case (i) the optimal (interior) signal will satisfy:
ρ =
1− λ
λ
(
2a− (a+ a)c
2a(1− c)
)
Proof. Lets begin with the highest matching equilibrium where high type users accept any partner they
encounter. The optimization program for the surplus maximizing platform is,
max
(ρa,ρb)∈Φii
λaλb
∩Ψii
1
λaU
i(a, λb, ρa, ρb) + (1− λa)U
i(a, λb, ρa, ρb)
+ λbU
i(b, λa, ρa, ρb) + (1− λb)U
i(b, λa, ρa, ρb)
= λa[bλb + b(1 − λb)− ac] + (1− λa)(b− ac)
+ λb[aλa + a(1− λa)− bc] + (1− λb)(a− bc)
Its clear again the platform will optimally set any feasible level of provision because the surplus is independent
of the signals. Moreover, if provision is costless the platform will provide noisy signals.
For the second highest ranked matching equilibrium again we will obtain an interior solution. The
optimization program will be,
max
(ρa,ρb)∈Ψii
Mixed,λaλb
∩Ψii
Mixed,1
λaU
ii
M (a, λb, ρa, ρb) + (1 − λa)U
ii
M (a, λb, ρa, ρb)
+ λbU
ii
M (b, λa, ρa, ρb) + (1− λb)U
ii
M (b, λa, ρa, ρb)
= λa[(b − ac)ρbλb(ρa + (1− ρa)σ
∗
bα
(ρa, ρb)) + (b− ac)(1− ρb)(1− λb)]
+ (1− λa)(b − ac)[λb(1− ρa + ρaσ
∗
bα
(ρa, ρb)) + (1 − λb)]
+ λb[(a− bc)ρaλa(ρb + (1− ρb)σ
∗
aβ(ρa, ρb)) + (a− bc)(1 − ρa)(1 − λa)]
+ (1− λb)(a− bc)[λa(1− ρb + ρbσ
∗
aβ(ρa, ρb)) + (1− λa)]
The first order conditions will be,
∂σ∗
bα
(ρa, ρb)
∂ρa
[(1 − ρa)λa(b− ac)ρbλb + ρa(1− λa)(b− ac)λb] = (1− σ
∗
bα
(ρa, ρb))[(1− λa)(b − ac)λb − λa(b− ac)ρbλb]
− λb[(a− bc)λa(ρb + (1− ρb)σ
∗
aβ(ρa, ρb))− (a− bc)(1− λa)]
−
∂σ∗(ρa, ρb)
∂ρa
[λb(a− bc)ρaλa(1− ρb) + (1− λb)(a− bc)λaρb]
∂σ∗aβ(ρa, ρb)
∂ρb
[λb(a− bc)ρaλa(1− ρb) + (1 − λb)(a− bc)λaρb] = (1− σ
∗
aβ(ρa, ρb))[(1 − λb)(a− bc)λa − λbλa(a− bc)ρa]
− λa[(b − ac)λb(ρa + (1− ρa)σ
∗
bα
(ρa, ρb))− (b− ac)(1− λb)]
−
∂σ∗
bα
(ρa, ρb)
∂ρb
[λa(b− ac)ρbλb(1 − ρa) + (1 − λa)(b − ac)λbρa]
To rewrite the expressions above need to make several definitions. As with the previous proposition
define ξσ∗
bα
ρa as the elasticity of σ
∗
bα
(ρa, ρb) wrt to the signal assigned to a-users, ρa; define ξσ∗
aβ
ρb as an
analogous elasticity. Additionally, define the following equations
ωa ≡ ωa(ρa, ρb) =
λa(b− ac)ρb
(1− ρa)λa(b − ac)ρb + ρa(1− λa)(b − ac)
ωb ≡ ωb(ρa, ρb) =
λb(a− bc)ρa
(1− ρb)λb(a− bc)ρa + ρb(1− λb)(a− bc)
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So the first order conditions boil down to,
ξσ∗
bα
ρa = ωa
(
1− σ∗
bα
σ∗
bα
)
− (1 − ωa)

ρa(a− bc)(ρb + (1− ρb)σ∗aβ)
(b− ac)ρbσ∗
bα
+
(bc− a)(1 − λa)ρa
(b − ac)λaρbσ∗
bα


−
σ∗aβ
σ∗
bα
ξσ∗
aβ
ρa
λb(a− bc)ρaλa(1 − ρb) + (1− λb)(a− bc)λaρb
(1− ρa)λa(b − ac)ρbλb + ρa(1 − λa)(b − ac)λb
ξσ∗
aβ
ρb = ωb
(
1− σ∗aβ
σ∗aβ
)
− (1− ωb)
[
ρb(b− ac)(ρa + (1 − ρa)σ
∗
bα
)
(a− bc)ρaσ∗aβ
+
(ac− b)(1− λb)ρb
(a− bc)λbρaσ∗aβ
]
−
σ∗
bα
σ∗aβ
ξσ∗
bα
ρb
λa(b− ac)ρbλb(1 − ρa) + (1 − λa)(b − ac)λbρa
(1 − ρb)λb(a− bc)ρaλa + ρb(1− λb)(a− bc)λa
Finally, for the one-sided case the expression simplifies as follows
ξσ∗
aα
ρ = ω(ρ)
(
1− σ∗aα
σ∗aα
)
− (1− ω(ρ))
[
σ∗aα + ρ(1− σ
∗
aα)
σ∗aα
+
ac− a
a− ac
(
1− λ
λ
)
1
σ∗aα
]
where ω(ρ) ≡ aPr{a}
aPr{a,α}+aPr{a}
Now continue with the matching equilibrium where high type users only accept high signal users. The
optimization program for the surplus maximizing platform will be,
max
(ρa,ρb)∈Φi
λaλb
∩Ψi
1
λa[(b − ac)ρbλbρa + (b − ac)(1− ρb)(1 − λb)]
+ (1− λa)(b − ac)(λb(1− ρa) + (1 − λb))
+ λb[(a− bc)ρaλaρb + (a− bc)(1− ρa)(1 − λa)]
+ (1− λb)(a− bc)(λa(1− ρb) + (1− λa))
And the first order conditions immediately yield,
ρa =
(
1− λa
λa
)(
b + a− (a+ b)c
(a+ b)(1 − c)
)
ρb =
(
1− λb
λb
)(
b+ a− (b+ a)c
(a+ b)(1 − c)
)
Finally, for the one-sided case we have
ρ =
(
1− λ
λ
)(
a− a+a2 c
a(1 − c)
)
Proposition (5) . Assume all users participate λ = λ. The profit maximizing platform will over-provide
information in relation to the surplus maximizing platform, e.g. ρprivate ≥ ρsurplus, whenever the high type
user accepts low signal partners with a positive probability. If the high type user always rejects low signal
partners, now the profit maximizing platform will under-provide information.
Proof. Arguments for each case follow from the analysis of the optimal information provision rules. Starting
with matching equilibrium Case (ii) Mixed we know the optimal level of provision for the profit maximizing
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platform is attained at a elasticity level of σ∗aα wrt ρ, i.e. ξσaα,ρ, higher than the elasticity level associated
to the optimal provision for the surplus maximizing platform. Finally, we only need to argue that the
probability high users accept a low signal partner is an increasing a convex function of ρ, e.g. σ∗
′
aα(ρ) > 0
and σ∗
′′
aα(ρ) > 0. Indeed, the first and second derivatives are
∂σ∗aα
∂ρ
T 0 iff
(
ac− a
a− ac
)(
1− λ
λ
)(
1 + ρ
ρ
)
T 1
∂2σ∗aα
∂ρ2
> 0 becuase
2
(1 − ρ)3
[(
ac− a
a− ac
)(
1− λ
λ
)(
1 + ρ
ρ
)
− 1
]
+
2
(1− ρ)4
(
ac− a
a− ac
)(
1− λ
λ
)
> 0
and while the second derivative is positive, the first one is can be positive or negative. The relevant parameters
to determine the sign of the first derivative are λ and the opportunity cost c; additionally, we can show the
sign is positive as long as λ is not high enough and simultaneously the opportunity cost is low enough.
Finally, we should show that under these conditions the optimization program, for both platforms, is not
well defined. Instead of doing so we will rely on a future result obtained in Theorem (1) which says that, for
these conditions on parameters λ and c, any platform will exclude low type users from the environment. To
wrap up, both the first and seconde derivative of σ∗aα wrt ρ will be positive for the parameter range where
the platform finds optimal to keep on board high and low type users.
We conclude then saying that the optimal provision level that maximizes profits will be strictly higher
than the level that maximizes surplus for all the parameter space. Figures (24) and (25) show that indeed
this is the case.
Figure 24: Case (ii) Mixed, ∆a Medium Figure 25: Case (ii) Mixed, ∆a Medium
For the other matching equilibrium, Case (i), we observe there is no interior solution for the profit
maximizing platform, moreover the optimal provision is the smallest level inside the feasible set. The
situation for the surplus maximizing platform is different, there we either find an interior solution or a
corner solution equivalent to the greatest level of provision in the feasible set. Figures (26) and (27) confirm
that, for all parameter space, the profit maximizing platform will under-provide information compared to
the surplus maximizing platform.
Proposition (6) . (i) The profit maximizing platform will extract the gross expected participation payoff
from the high type and low type users that participate. (ii) If all high types participate and a fraction of
50
Figure 26: Case (i), ∆a Medium Figure 27: Case (i), ∆a Medium
low types participate, the optimal (interior) mass of lows in the platform satisfy
ξρ(A),A = −
(
1− ρ(A)
ρ(A)
)
(2ρ(A)− 1)
where ρ satisfies U(a, λ, ρ) = U(a, λ, ρ), where λ = λ
λ+A
, and where ξρ(A),A is the elasticity of ρ(A) with
respect to A. (iii) If a fraction of high types participate and all low types participate, the optimal (interior)
mass of highs in the platform satisfy
ξρ(A),A =
1− ρ(A)
ρ(A
where ρ satisfies U(a, λ, ρ) = U(a, λ, ρ), where λ = 1−λ
A+1−λ
, and where ξρ(A),A is the elasticity of ρ(A) with
respect to A.
Proof. To show the profit maximizing platform extracts high types and low types gross expected participation
payoff we will focus to the case where all high type users participate and a fraction of low types participate.
The required condition here is that U(a, λ, ρ) ≥ P and U(a, λ, ρ) = P . The platform will fix the information
provision at a level such that low type users receive zero net expected participation payoff. Additionally, the
access fee will be pinned down with the gross expected participation payoff from the high type users. We
conclude that the platform will extract all the gross expected participation payoff from all high types and
from the fraction of low types that participate.
Only those matching equilibrium where the probability of being accepted by any randomly assigned
partner is less than one, i.e. Case (i) and Case (ii) Mixed, can support a partial groups participation
outcome. In other words, the matching equilibrium where high type users accept any partner cannot support
partial group participation because the expected participation payoff do not depend on signals (ρa, ρb), and
consequently the access fee is the unique screening tool any platform can use.
We will begin with the matching equilibrium where the high type users accept high signal partners, and
mix with low signal partners, i.e. Case (ii) Mixed. Focusing on the partial group participation case where
all high types participate, but only a fraction of low types participate, the fraction of high type b-users and
a-users inside the environment is
λb =
λb
λb +B
λa =
λa
λa +A
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where A ≤ (1 − λa) and B ≤ (1 − λb). The mass of a-users and b-users participating will respectively be
Ma = λa +A, and Mb = λb +B.
The profit maximizing platform will fix the information provision at a level such that low type a-users
and b-users expected participation payoff is equal to zero. To wit, this platform will pick some levels of ρ
a
and ρ
b
such that U iiM (a, λb, ρa, ρb) = U
ii
M (a, λb, ρa, ρb) and U
ii
M (b, λa, ρa, ρb) = U
ii
M (b, λa, ρa, ρb). Notice that
ρ
a
and ρ
b
are functions whose arguments are (A,B).
The set of feasible participation levels will be ΦiiMixed,λaλb
⋂
Ψii
Mixed,MaMb
, where
Φii
Mixed,λaλb
= {(A,B) ∈ [0, 1− λa]× [0, 1− λb] :
(ac− b)(1− λb)(2ρb(A,B)− 1) ≥
b− ac
(1 − ρ
a
(A,B))(b − ac)
[ρ
a
(A,B)ρ
b
(A,B)(ac− b)(1− λb)
+ (b− ac)(1− ρ
b
(A,B))(1 − ρ
a
(A,B)− ρ
a
(A,B)λa)],
(bc− a)(1− λa)(2ρa(A,B)− 1) ≥
a− bc
(1− ρ
b
(A,B))(a− bc)
[ρ
b
(A,B)ρ
a
(A,B)(bc− a)(1 − λa)
+ (a− bc)(1− ρ
a
(A,B))(1 − ρ
b
(A,B)− ρ
b
(A,B)λb)],
ac− b
b− ac
ρ
b
(A,B)(1 − λb)
(1 − ρ
b
(A,B))(1− ρ
a
(A,B))λb
−
ρ
a
(A,B)
1− ρ
a
(A,B)
∈ [0, 1],
bc− a
a− bc
ρ
a
(A,B)(1− λa)
(1 − ρ
a
(A,B))λa(1 − ρa(A,B))
−
ρ
b
(A,B)
1− ρ
b
(A,B)
∈ [0, 1]}
and additionally,
Ψii
Mixed,λaλb
= {(A,B) ∈ [0, 1− λa]× [0, 1− λb] :
U iiM (a, λb, ρa, ρb) ≥ 0
U iiM (b, λa, ρb, ρa) ≥ 0}
which is satisfied by construction.
The optimization program will be ,
max
(A,B)∈Φii
Mixed,λaλb
⋂
Ψii
Mixed,MaMb
λaU
ii
M (a, λb, ρa, ρb) +AU
ii
M (a, λb, ρa, ρb)
+ λbU
ii
M (b, λa, ρa, ρb) +BU
ii
M (b, λa, ρa, ρb)
= (λa +A)
ac− b
1− ρ
b
(A,B)
B
λb +B
(2ρ
b
(A,B)− 1)
+ (λb +B)
bc− a
1 − ρ
a
(A,B)
A
λa +A
(2ρ
a
(A,B)− 1)
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The first order conditions turns out to be,
0 =
(ac− b)B
λb +B

 (1− ρb(A,B))[2(λa +A)∂ρb∂A + (2ρb(A,B)− 1)] + (λa +A)(ρb(A,B)− 1)∂ρb∂A
(1− ρ
b
(A,B))2


+ (λb +B)(bc− a)

 (1− ρa(A,B))(λa +A)[2ρa(A,B)− 1 + 2A∂ρa∂A ]−A(2ρa − 1)[1− ρa(A,B)− (λa +A)∂ρa∂A ]
(1− ρ
a
(A,B))2(λa +A)2


0 =
(bc− a)A
λa +A

 (1− ρa(A,B))[2(λb +B)∂ρa∂B + (2ρa(A,B)− 1)] + (λb +B)(ρa(A,B)− 1)∂ρa∂B
(1 − ρ
a
(A,B))2


+ (λa +A)(ac− b)

 (1− ρb(A,B))(λb +B)[2ρb(A,B)− 1 + 2B ∂ρb∂B ]−B(2ρb − 1)[1− ρb(A,B)− (λb +B)∂ρb∂B ]
(1 − ρ
b
(A,B))2(λb +B)2


For the one-sided case the first order condition will be,
ξρA = −
(
1− ρ(A)
ρ(A)
)
(2ρ(A)− 1)
where ξρA is the elasticity of ρ with respect to A.
Continue now with the other matching equilibrium, i.e. Case (i), where high types users accept only
high signal partners and reject low signal partners. Focus on the partial group participation where a fraction
of high type a-users and b-users participate. The fraction of high types inside the environment will be,
λa =
A
A+ (1− λa)
λb =
B
B + (1− λb)
where A ≤ λa and B ≤ λb, and the mass of a-users and b-users participating will be Ma = A+(1−λa) and
Mb = B + (1− λb).
The platform must fixed the provision of information to levels ρa and ρb such that high types net
expected participation payoff is equal to zero. To wit, define functions ρa(A,B) and ρb(A,B) that guarantee
U i(a, λb, ρa, ρb) = U
i(a, λb, ρa, ρb) and U
i(b, λa, ρa, ρb) = U
i(b, λa, ρa, ρb).
The optimization program will be
max
(A,B)∈Φi
λaλb
⋂
Ψi
MaMb
AU i(a, λb, ρa, ρb) + (1− λa)U
i(a, λb, ρa, ρb)
+ BU i(b, λa, ρa, ρb) + (1− λb)U
i(b, λa, ρa, ρb)
= (A+ (1− λa))(b − ac)
[
B
B + 1− λb
(1− ρa(A,B)) +
1− λb
B + (1− λb)
]
+ (B + (1− λb))(a− bc)
[
A
A+ 1− λa
(1− ρb(A,B)) +
1− λa
A+ (1− λa)
]
The first order conditions will be,
0 = (b− ac)
[
−(A+ 1− λa)
∂ρa
∂A
+
B
B + 1− λb
(1− ρa(A,B)) +
1− λb
B + 1− λb
]
+ (a− bc)(B + 1− λb)
[
−
A(1 − ρb(A,B)) + 1− λa
(A+ 1− λa)2
+
1− ρb(A,B)−A
∂ρb
∂A
A+ 1− λa
]
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Finally, focusing on the one-sided case, the first order condition will be
ξρA =
1− ρ(A)
ρ(A)
where ξρA is the elasticity of ρ(A) with respect to A.
Theorem (1) . (i) The profit maximizing platform will not offer the Informative Menu for low type
users, (ii) There will be a unique optimal menu for each point in the parameter space (∆a, λ, c), and (iii)
Only Case (ii) Mixed matching equilibrium could be optimally supported at the Hype Menu.
Proof. The objective is to characterize the set of optimal menus, e.g. access fee and information provision,
for the profit maximizing platform. The analysis for the one-sided platform is simpler than for the surplus
maximizing platform because we only need to compare menus that induce full group participation, i.e.
λ ∈ {0, λ, 1}.
Informative Menus for high or low types where described in Proposition (2). We showed that if the
platform offers a menu (P, ρ) = (a(1 − c), 1) only high type users will participate, and they will suffer
full rent extraction. The profits will be λa(1 − c). On the other hand, if the platform offers a menu
(P, ρ) = (a(1− c), 1/2) only low type users will participate, and they also will suffer full rent extraction. The
profits for this case will be (1 − λ)a(1 − c).
Hype Menu, described in Proposition (3), induce all users to participate. In particular, the access fee
will be equal to the low type’s expected participation payoff, U(a, λ, ρ∗), and the signal will neither be
fully informative nor fully uninformative. The rule for optimal information provision is also described at
Proposition (3). Finally low type users will suffer full rent extraction.
Platform’s profits with the Hype Menu will be equal to U(a, λ, ρ∗), but its value will depend on which
matching equilibrium will prevail. With the highest ranked matching equilibrium profits will be a(1 − c),
and with the second highest ranked matching equilibrium profits will be
a
a(1− ρ∗)2
[
a(1− c)(1 − ρ∗)(1− ρ∗ − ρ∗λ) + (ac− a)(ρ∗)2(1− ρ∗λ)
]
We can also calculate the profits with the remaining matching equilibria, but its possible to show that profits
under them are strictly lower than those obtained with the two highest ranked matching equilibria. Instead
of doing the comparison using the analytic expression we will provide the intuition. The objective of the
platform will be induce users to use the highest ranked equilibrium, but if this is not possible he will use the
information provision such that the profits of the second highest ranked equilibrium match or exceeds the
profits from the highest ranked equilibrium. This “strategy” is impossible with the lowest ranked equilibria
because there high type users will always reject low signal partners.
Which matching equilibrium will the platform use? The parameter space is determined by ∆a, λ, and c.
Without loss of generality fix ∆a. We can show that the higher is λ, the more likely is that the highest ranked
matching equilibrium will outweigh the second highest ranked equilibrium. Take the extreme situation where
λ = 1. As the profits with the highest ranked equilibrium is a(1− c), and the profits with the second highest
ranked is a(1 − c)1−2ρ1−ρ < 0, the profit maximizing platform will use the former matching equilibrium. But
in the other extreme, λ = 0, while the profit with the former equilibrium remains unchanged, the profit with
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the second highest ranked equilibrium is a(1− c) + a
a
(ac− a)( ρ1−ρ)
2. In this situation the profit maximizing
platform will force users to play mixed strategies. Profit functions are continuous, then we posit regions with
low λ will use matching equilibrium Case (ii) Mixed, and regions with high λ and low c, will use matching
equilibrium Case (ii).
Figures (28) and (29) confirm this. Using Mathematica we compare at each point in the parameter space
(∆a, λ, c) the value function of the profits for matching equilibrium Case (ii) and Case (ii) Mixed. These
figures use a fixed value of ∆a but results are robust.
Figure 28: λ = λ, Case (ii) Mixed ≥ Case (ii) Figure 29: λ = λ, Case (ii) Mixed ≥ Case (ii)
To determine which menus are optimal we must compare the profits coming from the Informative Menus
for high and low type, and Hype Menu at each point on the parameter space (∆a, λ, c). Instead of doing the
comparison using analytic expression we opted to use numerical (constrained) optimization techniques and
let Mathematica do the comparisons at each point in the parameter space. We have two reasons for this
decision. First, although the model is very simple, the value function of the profits is very non linear making
the comparison cumbersome. And second, using Mathematica we can obtain nice graphical representations
of the regions where a particular menu becomes optimal.
We obtain two conclusions. The profit maximizing platform do not find optimal to offer an Informative
Menu for the low types, this implies he always wants to keep on board the high type users. This result can
be heuristically shown if we fix ∆a, and analyze a situation with a low λ, and another with a high λ. In the
former situation, when the platform uses a Hype Menu the profits will be close to
a(1− c) +
a
a
(ac− a)(
ρ
1− ρ
)2
, and the profits with an Informative Menu for lows yield a profit equal to (1 − λ)a(1 − c), so its clear he
will prefer the first menu. In the opposite situation, with a high λ, the profit from an Informative Menu
for highs yields a profit equal to λa(1− c), and the profits from an Informative Menu for lows yields profits
equal to (1 − λ)a(1 − c).
The second conclusion is about where the Informative Menu for high types is optimal. We obtain that
for high values of λ and “low enough” values for the opportunity cost c, the profit maximizing platform will
only keep on board the high type users.
Figures (30) and (31) show which regions, in the parameter space (λ, c), support either the Hype Menu
or the Informative Menu for high types.
55
Figure 30: Profit Max., ∆a Small Figure 31: Profit Max., ∆a Medium
Corollary (3) . The region, in the parameter space (λ, c), where the Hype Menu is optimal is positively
related with the population heterogeneity, e.g. ∆a.
Proof. See figures (30) and (31). Its evident that the higher it is the heterogeneity of users in the population,
the bigger will be the region in the parameter space (λ, c) supporting the Informative Menu for high types.
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